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INTRODUCTION 
Children, as well as adults, often make judgments about other 
people. These judgments may involve assessment of other's intentions, 
attitudes, emotions, ideas, and even personality attributes. Our 
judgments about others are important, for they are one of the deter-
minants of the way we interact with others. For example, we behave 
differently towards a person we judge as "kind" than we do towards a 
person we judge as "cruel." One of the keys to understanding human 
behavior, then, is to understand how people make social judgments 
about others. 
Social judgments are largely based on information provided by 
direct or indirect observations of people. For example, we may con-
clude that Person A likes or dislikes Person B by directly observing 
Person A's treatment of Person B or by indirectly receiving informa-
tion about Person A's attitudes (e.g., a third party might tell us 
that Person A dislikes Person B). However, the person making the 
social judgment may or may not use all of the information available. 
In the above example, it is possible that we may choose not to select 
hearsay evidence as a basis of our impression, and instead rely on 
our own observations. 
Once the observer selects the information deemed necessary to 
make a judgment, the information must be organized into a final 
impression. That is, when making social judgments, we usually do 
1 
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not list behavioral observations or information coming from various 
sources, but organize it into judgments that explain or "sum-up" the 
selected information. For example, if I see John hit Fred and kick 
his dog, I might conclude that John has an aggressive nature or that 
he is angry. This judgment is based on John's behaviors which are 
oraanized or "explained" by concluding he is aggressive or feeling 
0 
angry. By themselves, the actual behaviors tell us little about John. 
Only by examining both behaviors and their internal relationships 
(i.e., aggressiveness) can we make an inference about John's mood or 
personality. Selection and organization of information, then, appear 
intrinsic to social judgments. 
Although both children and adults may observe or be given the 
same information about others, it cannot be assumed that children and 
adults will select the same information on which to base their 
impressions. Nor can it be assumed that both children and adults will 
organize their selected information in the same manner in forming 
their judgments. It is plausible that cognitive limitations of 
younger children might influence social judgments by affecting the 
selection and organizational processes. The present studies inves-
tigate these possibilities. 
Cognitive Phases of Development 
Piaget (1932) asserts that children go through several sequen-
tial phases in the development of their cognitive abilities. Each 
phase is qualitatively different from the others, characterized by 
differential capacities in dealing with the environment. Three 
phases of cognitive development are of special importance to social 
judgments. 
The first is the "preoperational" phase which occurs approxi-
mately between the ages of two to seven years. One pervasive char-
acteristic of this phase is that of "egocentrism," which means 
children's thoughts are centered on their own points of view, and 
thus, they are unable to conceive of the world from other people's 
perspectives. Gradually children relinquish their egocentric or uni-
dimensional perspectives and begin to realize that their perceptions 
of a situation may be different from others. This occurs during the 
phase of "concrete operations" which usually emerges around the 
seventh year and terminates during the ages of approximately eleven 
to twelve. During the succeeding "formal operations" phase, children 
can consider possible events in addition to actual ones. They are 
able not only to think of actual relations, but also become capable 
of considering hypothetical events and relationships that might occur. 
In one illustration of how cognitive abilities affect judgments, 
Piaget (1932) asserts that preoperational children base their moral 
judgments on the objective consequences of transgressions, as opposed 
to concrete operational children who examine the intentions of the 
transgressor. Preoperational children bound by an egocentric per-
spective do not have the cognitive abilities to. examine both conse-
quences and intentions in making their judgments. Concrete operation-
al children, not limited by an egocentric perspective, can examine 
both types of information and base their judgments on the less 
salient intentionality information. As empirical support, Hebble 
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(1971), using hypothetical stories, varied both the consequences of 
an action and the behavioral intentions of the actor. Piaget's 
hypotheses were confirmed in that the children operating at the pre-
operational level based their judgments primarily on the consequences 
of the action and largely ignored the intentions of the transgressor. 
For example, an actor who accidentally broke several dishes was Judged 
"naughtier" than an actor who intentionally broke one. Children 
operating at the concrete operational level rated the actor as less 
"naughty" than did the preoperational children when the intentions 
were good, regardless of the consequences of.the action. Hebble 
concluded that children operating at the concrete operational level 
have the cognitive ability to assess intentionality when making moral 
judgments. Children operating at the preoperational level, however, 
have not developed this capacity. 
More recent research (e.g., Darley, Klosson, & Zanna, 1978; 
Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1973), however, contends that 
younger children do have the capacity to consider intentionality 
information when making moral judgments. Nevertheless, a "Piagetian" 
perspective might explain any inability of preoperational children 
to take account of an actor's intentions as resulting from their 
egocentric or unidimensional perspectives. That is, preoperational 
children's highly centered logic permits them to attend to only one 
aspect or dimension of a situation at one time. Since the conse-
quences of an action are more salient than the intentions of the 
actor, it is not surprising that preoperational children often base 
their judgments on the consequences. Concrete operational children, 
4 
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however, have acquired the ability to "decenter" or attend to several 
aspects of a situation simultaneously. This ability permits concrete 
children to shift their attention away from the objective consequences 
of an action to permit greater assessment of the actor's intentions. 
The Development of Social Judgments 
In addition to moral judgments, social judgments might also be 
influenced by the child's cognitive capacities. For example, dispo-
sitional judgments might be affected by cognitive abilities. Kelley's 
attribution theory (1967) states that to the extent that a person's 
behaviors do not vary over time and situations, an observer can be 
confident that the behaviors are reflective of some personality 
attribute and not the situation. It is possible that a child's ego-
centric perspective may limit examination of this behavioral consis-
tency, consequently affecting judgments. Ernest (1976) examined 
this attribution process by presenting children with a series of 
three behaviors which an actor was said to have performed (e.g., "John 
hit Tim," "John kicked Ken," "John gave Gary a present"). On the 
basis. of this behavioral information, the child made dispositional 
judgments about the actor's "goodness" or "badness." Differences 
were found between preoperational and concrete operational children 
in how they dealt with consistent and inconsistent behavioral se-
quences. Specifically, preoperational children (mean age 6~5 years) 
had a harder time integrating inconsistent behavioral information 
(e.g., two positive behaviors and a negative behavior), than concrete 
operational and formal operational children (respective mean ages 
9,7 and 19,8 years). Ernest concluded that the preoperational 
children's egocentric perspectives limited their ability to think 
about others as possessing both good and bad dispositional character-
istics. Expecting others to be absolutely good or absolutely bad, 
preoperational children failed to integrate inconsistent behaviors 
into judgments that reflected all of the information. 
6 
Earlier researchers also have concluded that with age and cog-
nitive development, children do become more complex in making social 
judgments. For example, Gollin (1958) found that older children are 
better able to integrate varied information about a person than younger 
children. The paradigm involved assessment of sequentially filmed 
scenes depicting a child behaving in socially desirable manners 
followed by socially undesirable behaviors. Three groups of subjects 
(mean ages 10,7; 13,6 and 16,6 years) were asked what they thought 
of the child and what they had seen him do. Responses were scored 
according to whether or not they used inferences and concepts in 
their reports. An "inference" was credited to subjects if they 
attempted to go beyond the information presented and described some 
underlying motive or situation that accounted for one of the actions 
in the film. Subjects were credited with a "concept" if they 
attempted to relate and integrate conflicting features in the other 
person's behavior. Results showed an increase with age in the use 
of both "inferences" and "concepts," indicating that the ability to 
relate and organize information about other people follows a develop-
mental sequence. 
Another indication of developmental changes in social judgments 
is provided by Livesley and Bromley (1973). They asked subjects of 
various ages to describe eight people known to them: a man, woman, 
boy, and girl they liked; and a man, woman, boy, and girl they dis-
liked. For the purpose of a content analysis, the descriptions were 
divided into "units." Each unit was a statement or idea defined as 
one item of information referring directly or indirectly to the other 
person. Experimenters then assigned these units to one of two types 
of statements--central or peripheral. Central statements included 
references to personal qualities and general habits. Peripheral 
statements referred to appearance, identity (e.g., age, sex, resi-
dence), social roles, possessions, details of family and so on. 
Results indicated that older children (mean age 8,6 years) used more 
central statements in their descriptions than younger children (mean 
age 6,7 years). This change in strategy in impression formation 
between the ages of seven and eight years was interpreted by Livesley 
and Bromley as resulting from the child's relinquishment of egocen-
trism. As children become capable of inferential thought, they in-
tegrate events separated in time, and find underlying regularities, 
similarities, and consistencies in the other's behaviors. 
Although cognitive abilities appear to affect social judgments, 
it is not clear how these abilities specifically affect the selection 
and organization processes. That is, it is not clear whether sub-
jects at different cognitive levels of development select different 
information as a basis of their judgments; select the same 
7 
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information, but organize it in different ways; or both, differently 
select and organize information. Further, if selection and organi-
zational processes are different, it is not apparent how cognitive 
abilities influence or shape these processes. Part of the reason 
why these issues have not been resolved may lie in the studies them-
selves, since there have been wide variations across studies in the 
sources and types of information given, and in the kinds of judgments 
the subjects are asked to make. For example, some studies give 
behavioral information orally, while others allow the subject to 
directly observe the actor's actions. Some present information per-
taining to the actor's intentions, while other studies give informa-
tion pertaining to the actor's feelings. Further, some studies ask 
for dispositional judgments, while others ask the subject to make 
moral judgments. Although examining variations in types of informa-
tion and judgments is important, it obscures the basic cognitive 
processes by which the judgments are made. Research is needed that 
toore clearly delineates the selection and organizational processes, 
while more tightly controlling the nature of the information on which 
the judgments are based. 
Information Integration Theory 
Anderson (1974) has developed a model through which these 
selection and organization processes might be studied systematically. 
His paradigm involves presenting a series of trait adjectives (e.g., 
"· "" n1ce, intelligent") to subjects and asking them to rate the 
"likability" of a person characterized by these traits. The advantage 
of this trait approach is that it allows clear control over the 
nature of the stimulus materials. Specifically, by obtaining the 
"likability" ratings of each trait word independent of all other 
words, it is possible to investigate the processes by which judgments 
are made. Other techniques (e.g., presentation of behaviors by 
videotape) are less adaptable to exploration of these processes since 
the stimulus materials often vary on a number of dimensions. For 
example, "good" and "bad" behaviors may differ not only in their 
evaluative goodness, but in affective cues (e.g., facial regard) 
elicited by the actor. Although trait words may also vary on dimen-
sions other than likability (e.g., trait stability: Edwards & Ernest, 
1976), this should present no systematic confounds if judgments are 
made on the same dimension on which the individual traits were rated. 
That is, if judgments of likability are based on traits independently 
rated for likabili·ty, other trait characteristics should not system-
atically affect this overall judgment. 
Anderson (1974) proposes two operations involved in information 
integration theory which parallel the processes of selection and 
organization. The first is that of "valuation" which might be con-
sidered one of stimulus selection. Specifically, any judgment 
requires a preliminary evaluation of the meaning and relevance of the 
stimuli for the task at hand. The role of the valuation operation is 
to determine what the stimuli (i.e., traits) mean and how much impor-
tance is to be given to them. Previous usage of the term "selection" 
has emphasized the importance judges place on information. The use 
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of the term "valuation" is more global since it implies that judges 
also extract what the unit of information actually means. Once the 
information is evaluated, it has to be organized or combined into an 
overall judgment. This second operation is that of "integration." 
Generally, people appear to combine information by "averaging" the 
individual values of each unit of information on whatever dimension 
the overall judgment is being made. 
Anderson (1974) proposes an algebraic model by which both the 
valuation and integration processes can be represented. Social judg-
ments then can be understood as a product of basic mathematical 
operations. Two stimulus parameters have special importance to these 
mathematical operations: scale value and weight. As previously 
indicated, the scale value of a stimulus trait can be considered as 
the location of the stimulus on some dimension of judgment. The 
concept of "weight" can be viewed as the amount of information a 
given trait represents or how important it is relative to other in-
formation. Of course, both weight and scale value will depend on the 
dimension of judgment. The same stimulus trait may have different 
importance and meaning for different judgmental tasks. Each task sets 
up a valuation operation by virtue of which the scale values and 
weights are defined. The values given to these stimulus parameters 
are determined by the valuation process. Variations in this valuation 
process, however, can be found among individuals. The scale values 
and weights assigned to particular traits then may vary across sub-
jects. These variations may be due to a variety of factors, including 
differences in learned trait associations, situations, and even 
cognitive abilities (c.f., Kaplan, 1975). 
Mathematically, an averaging model represents the integration 
operation. Thus, both the valuation and integration process are 
represented by the following equation: 
N 
R = (w0 s 0 + r wisi) i=l 
N 
I ( L wi + w
0
) 
i=l 
(1) 
The final judgment "R" is based on "N" stimulus traits with scale 
values "s" and weight "w." Scale value is defined as the quantita-
11 
tive representation of the location of the information on a particular 
judgment dimension, and "weight" as the functional importance of a 
given stimulus for the required judgment. The sum of the weights 
is assumed to be equal to 1. These components include a scale value 
(s 0 ) and -.Jeight (w0 ) for an initial impression, which is the judge's 
impression of the person prior to receiving any information about him 
--that is, an impression based on no information. The final judgment, 
then, is the weighted average of the scale values of the stimulus 
information and initial impression. 
A number of studies have empirically supported the weighted 
average model for adults. For example, Anderson (1965) presented 
six types of trait sets to subjects: two highly likable traits (HH), 
two traits of medium high likability (~), two traits of medium 
low likability (~M-), two traits of low likability (LL), and cornbin-
at ions of the b ( · H.~.+..+ a ove 1.e., ~l'M'; If some type· of 
averaging mechanism were operative, it would be expected that the 
Composed of evaluatively different stimulus combinations would sets 
have been rated somewhere between their isovalent components. Two 
critical comparisons confirmed the averaging hypothesis. That is, 
HHM+M+ sets yielded a less favorable response or impression than HH 
12 
sets. Similarly, for negative information, LLM_M_ sets yielded a less 
unfavorable response than LL sets. This result has been verified 
repeatedly (e.g., Anderson, 1968; Anderson & Alexander, 1971; Hen-
drick, 1968; Lampel & Anderson, 1968; Oden & Anderson, 1971). Ander-
son has concluded that since the weighted average formula accounts 
for very extensive sets of social judgment data, it may be considered 
a basic psychological process. 
Information Integration Processes of Children 
If it is true that averaging is a basic psychological process 
of adults, it would be interesting to determine whether children's 
judgments of social stimuli are parallel to those of adults. If,the 
valuation and integration operations of children are similar to the 
operations of adults, then judgments should be the same. Butzin and 
Anderson (1973) tested this hypothesis by having children of various 
ages judge their liking for pairs of toys. Specifically, ten younger 
children (mean ages 6,2 years) and twenty older children (mean ages 
9,7 years) judged individual toys and pairs of toys in terms of 
how much they would like to play with them. To insure equal "weight-
. " f 1 ng o the pairs of toys, children were instructed to make their 
judgments contingent on the fact that they would have to play with 
the toys an equal amount of time. Across all age groups, an averaging 
del predicted their judgments quite well. Toys judged of medium 
mo 
likability paired with highly liked toys were judged somewhere 
between the responses of the two toys alone. Similarly, toys of 
medium likability paired with highly disliked toys were judged 
between the single toy ratings. 
Hendrick, Franz, and Hoving (1975) also tested the averaging 
model by having children make judgments of their liking of people 
described by trait adjectives. Specifically, kindergarten, second, 
fourth, and sixth grade children (respective mean ages: 5,9; 7,9; 
10~1; and 11,0 years) judged individual and paired adjectives. A 
13 
test of averaging was provided by comparing a positive and a moder-
ately positive pair (HM+) with a single positive trait (H). Converse-
ly, negative and moderately negative pairs (LM-) were compared with 
negative singletons (L). Pairs of traits yielded less polarized 
judgments than the single trait ratings, indicating that children 
also average trait information. In addition, Hendrick et al. had 
subjects rate the inconsistent trait pair "good" and "bad"--the 
archetype of polar opposites. Support for the averaging hypothesis 
was again found when subjects rated the single traits "good" and "badn 
as more polarized than the pairings of these traits. On the basis of 
these findings, Hendrick et al. suggested that averaging may be an 
inherent process of the mind since young children have no formal 
concept of the mathematical operation. 
In light of other studies (e.g., Ernest, 1976; Gollin, 1958; 
Livesley & Bromley, 1973) which have indicated that young children 
have difficulty integrating information, it is interesting that both 
14 
Butzin and Anderson (1973) and Hendrick et al. (1975) found support 
for the averaging hypothesis. Of course, any failure to integrate 
information may be due to the stimulus materials in the particular 
studies. Since the traits should provide clearest control over the 
nature of the stimulus materials, it might be tempting to conclude 
that children can average information much as adults. However, 
children's "averaging" abilities may be limited to only two items, 
since in the studies of Hendrick et aL and Butzin and Anderson, only 
two traits (toys) were tested. It also is possible that children may 
have simply been expressing their uncertainty about pairs of traits 
(toys) by making ratings falling between the single item ratings. 
The exact processes children use remains obscured when judgments are· 
based on only two items. A better approach to examining information 
integration processes of children then would involve the use of 
several pieces of information. However, results based on more than 
two items should still be interpreted with caution since several 
pieces of information may exceed children's memory capacity (Haith, 
Morrison, Sheingold & Mindes, 1970). 
In some ways it would be surprising if young children inte-
grated or averaged information in the same T..vay as adults. Many 
studies have found differences in the weighting of the informational 
components as a function of rater characteristics. For example, 
variations in "cognitive complexity," or the number of dimensions 
employed in judging others, appear to affect the integration of 
information. Crockett (1965) has found that "low complexity" sub-
jects have less ability at synthesizing inconsistent information. 
"High complexity" subjects, on the other hand, are better able to 
arrive at more comprehensive impressions. Similar results have 
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been obtained using conceptually similar dimensions. For example, 
"high differentiators," defined by the ability to discriminate be-
tween interpersonal concepts, give more integrated or ambivalent 
responses to inconsistent stimuli than do "low differentiators" 
(Harvey, Hunt & Schroeder, 1961; Nidorf, 1961; Ware & Harvey, 1967) 
and discriminate more between persons described by different sets of 
information (Kaplan, 1968). In general, the presence of certain 
styles seems to increase the tendency to discount or ignore inconsis-
tent information, resulting in univalent impressions. This observa-
tion can be handled by the notion that some people place more empha-
sis (i.e., weight) on certain information components. In light of 
the effects of variations in cognitive styles, it seems somewhat 
plausible that variations in cognitive abilities would also affect 
the weight parameter in the integration of information. In fact, 
Kaplan (1975) notes that it would be instructive to examine develop-
mental changes in integration processes. 
There also may be another reason why children's organization 
of stimulus information may not be comparable to that of adults. 
Consistent with earlier cited research (i.e., Ernest, 1976; Gollin, 
1958; Livesley & Bromley, 1973), children may not have the cognitive 
abilities necessary to average information. Preoperational children 
(ages four to seven years), who have not mastered the principle of 
invariance, might not be expected to average information. The prin-
ciple of invariance refers to the ability to understand that objects 
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or quantities are "conserved" and remain constant despite changes in 
appearance. Young children have difficulty comprehending this 
principle largely because of their unidimensional perspective. This 
perspective limits children in thinking about objects as having 
unvarying properties. Much as children have to learn that the 
physical world has stable and permanent ''inner" properties (e.g., 
that volume does not change with shape), they also may have to learn 
that there are constant and invariant features in human behavior and 
personality (c.f., Livesley & Bromley, 1973). Children who have not 
mastered the principle of invariance then may form impressions 
differently than people who have mastered this principle. For 
example, inconsistent information may not appear inconsistent to 
children \vho have not learned to expect constancy in personality 
characteristics. There may be no "need" to reconcile the inconsis-
tency. Rather, the most salient or obvious features of the trait 
descriptions will probably guide preoperational children's judgments. 
For example, a person described by four likable traits (e.g., nice, 
kind, smart, funny) may be rated similar to a person described by 
one dislikable and three likable traits (e.g., mean, nice, smart, 
funny). Since the highest proportion of positive or negative infor-
mation will probably be the most salient, the likable traits will 
determine preoperational children's judgments in the example. An 
II 
unequally-weighted average" model then might be most descriptive of 
the integration capacities of preoperational children. That is, it 
might be expected that preoperational children will ignore or dis-
count inconsistent information and place most emphasis or weight on 
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the most salient or highest proportion of either positive or negative 
information in the trait set. 
Concrete operational (ages seven to eleven years) and formal 
operational children (over eleven years), who have mastered the 
invariance principle, also would be expected to "average" trait in-
formation. However, it might be expected that all the stimulus infor-
mation would be considered before a judgment is made. Specifically, 
they may try to bring "meaning" to conflicting information by arriv-
ing at a judgment reflective of all the traits. Such a judgment 
would be produced by a simple averaging of the scale values of the 
traits, where all traits are given equal weights. For example, a 
person described by four likable traits would be rated as more lik-
able than a person described by one dislikable and three likable 
traits. An "equally-weighted average" model would then be descrip-
tive of the judgments of concrete operational and formal operational 
subjects. Study I investigated these hypotheses by determining 
whether subjects of various levels of cognitive development do differ-
entially integrate or average trait information. 
Valuation Processes of Children 
Following Anderson's (1974) averaging model, differences in 
judgments among subjects of various cognitive levels may not neces-
sarily imply differences in integration processes. Rather, any 
differences simply may imply variations in the valuation operation. 
Studies II and III were designed to investigate whether differences 
in Valuation processes are found among different cognitive levels. 
The valuation process of adults is not always constant. That 
when presented with trait information, adults do not always is, 
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follow a simple averaging model. The failure to follow such a model 
indicates differential weighting of the traits. Specifically, more 
importance or value is placed on some of the traits at the expense 
of others (assuming the sum of the weights equals one). This differ-
ential weighting process is analogous to biases in the selection of 
the information. In a list of traits certain words seem to be 
selected out as the basis of one's impression, while other traits 
are ignored or given less emphasis. In adult judgments, two pheno-
mena demonstrate differential weighting of the trait information--
"set-size" effects and ''order" effects. 
Set-size effects. Set-size effects refer to the tendency of 
larger sets of traits to be rated more extreme (either positively or 
negatively) than smaller sets of traits--both being of the same 
average value. For example, a person described by the set of six 
positive traits, "intelligent, sincere, good, kind, brave, happy," 
might be rated as more likable than a person described by the three 
positive traits, "intelligent, good, brave." Since the average value 
of the larger set is the same as the average value of the smaller 
set, a simple averaging model cannot explain this phenomena. 
These set-size effects, however, can be mathematically repre-
sented if we assume a weighted average and make use of the internal 
variable I 0 , with value s 0 and weight w0 • This internal state (I0 ) 
or initial impression with a scale value and weight is assumed to 
be averaged in along with the overt stimuli. From equation (1), 
t a set of "k" pieces of informat.;on .;s ·. the response o · • • 
w0 s 0 + kwi si 
w0 + kwi 
(2) 
A quantitative test of this model w·as provided by Anderson (1967). 
That is, if the model is correct, then the estimates of w should be 
equal, independent of set size. Using a within-subjects design and 
sets of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 adjectives of equal value, this was found 
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to be true. The weights were nearly independent of set size, except 
for a big jump in the set of six traits. Replicating these sets 
with the addition of a nine trait set, Anderson (1967) found this 
jump to be produced by an end effect tendency. That is, the jump 
occurred for the set of nine traits in the second study. 
A test of whether children weight information in the same way 
as adults then might be provided by a test of this model. Specifical-
ly, if set-size effects do not exist for children, this would indi-
cate a reduction in stimulus weights across increasing set sizes. 
Of course, an alternative explanation may be memory limitations of 
younger children. Set-size effects may not occur simply because 
children do not have the ability to remember more than two or three 
pieces of information at one time. 
A test of set-size effects for children was provided by Cook, 
Goldman, and Olczak (1975). Elementary and high school subjects 
(respective ages 12-13 and 17-18 years) rated the likability of per-
sons described by sets of 1, 3, and 6 adjectives of equal value. 
These stimulus traits were presented simultaneously. Results 
. d" ated a strong set-size effect for each age group. This study, 
J.n J.C 
was limited since preoperational children were not tested. however, 
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That is, 11 to 13 year olds would most likely be in the concrete 
operational or formal operational phases of development, while the 
16_18 year olds would most likely be in the formal operational phase. 
The extent to which set-size effects generalize to all cognitive 
levels, then, is not known. An adequate test of these effects would 
entail examining the responses of younger preoperational children. 
Livesley and Bromley (1973) contend that preoperational chil-
dren's egocentrism leads them to view others as absolutely good or 
bad. If we assume this to be accurate, it would be somewhat sur-
prising if set-size effects were found. That is, once a decision 
of goodness or badness is reached, increasing the amount of infor-
mation would not be expected to further polarize judgments. This 
would be reflected in the weight parameter where the weights of 
larger sets would be lower relative to the smaller sets. Differences 
in valuation processes between preoperational children and the older 
concrete operational and formal operational subjects, then, might 
be attributed to the weighting of the stimulus information. 
Valuation processes also might differ as a result of the "mean-
ing" of the stimulus information. Although traits may have similar 
evaluative meaning, traits may vary in their denotative meaning. A 
young child's trait vocabulary may be less differentiated than the 
vocabulary of adults. Only as a child becomes older may traits be-
come less global in their implications and begin to take on specific 
denot t · a lve meaning. Although the exact implications a trait denotes 
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has never been tested across different age groups, Livesley and 
Bromley (1973) found that seven year olds as contrasted with older 
children used fewer and more global terms in describing others. If 
trait implications are more global and diffuse for younger children, 
this may mediate any set-size effects. That is, presenting traits 
of similar scale values to children may be tantamount to presenting 
redundant information. For example, presenting the traits "good" 
and "smart" to children may be essentially redundant since one trait 
may imply the other for the younger children. This would not be 
expected for older children and adults for whom traits have become 
more differentiated and precise. 
Past studies with adults have shown that redundancy does 
attenuate any set-size effects. For example, Dustin and Baldwin 
(1966) investigated the effect of varying the degrees of redundancy 
or judged implications between pairs of adjectives upon the overall 
impression. They found that the mean of the evaluations of the two 
traits in isolation was more extreme than the evaluation of the 
trait pairs. Further, this difference in polarity tended to be 
greater \vhen the t\vO traits strongly implied each other and least 
when the degree of implication was weak. 
Radtke (1967) investigated the effects of redundancy while 
holding the mean evaluation constant. Redundancy was created by 
repeating traits and by using synonyms. These sets then were com-
pared to non-redundant sets. All sets were of equal size. No 
difference was found between judgments of sets containing synonyms 
and those not containing synonyms, although sets containing repeated 
traits were judged less extreme as compared to synonym and non-
synonym sets. 
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Kaplan (1971) determined redundancy by having subjects select 
traits from a master list which were implied by a given trait or by 
having them rate the likelihood of one trait implying another. For 
both methods, redundancy was found to attenuate the set-size effect. 
That is, increases in response polarity, with increased number of 
descriptive traits, were greater in sets of non-redundant, as compared 
to redundant, sets. Kaplan concluded that redundancy of stimulus. 
traits serves to reduce the weight associated with traits in the 
impression formation process. This is consistent with Schmidt (1969) 
who earlier suggested that redundancy may operate by reducing the 
information contained in a set of traits. This, in turn, would reduce 
the weight of trait components in the combination process. 
If traits do have non-specific global implications for younger 
children, then increasing the number of like-valued traits may be 
psychologically equivalent to presenting redundant information. If 
this is so, we might expect a decrease in the weight parameter across 
increasingly larger sets, while judgments remain the same. 
Study II was designed to investigate whether set-size effects 
are generalizable to preoperational children. For two possible reasons 
it is predicted that they would not. The first because preoperational 
children tend to be absolute in their judgments (Livesley & Bromley, 
1973); and second, because traits may be more global or have broader 
implications for preoperational children than older concrete 
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operational and formal operational subjects. Evidence that set-size 
effects are not generalizable could indicate differences in valuation 
processes of subjects of different cognitive levels. 
Order effects. If trait adjectives are presented one at a 
time in succession (i.e., serial presentation), the order in which 
they are arranged will usually influence the final judgment. Primacy 
effects occur when the first adjectives in a stimulus sequence influ-
ence the final judgment more than later appearing traits. Such 
effects are of interest since they imply variations in valuation 
processes. That is, the weights of the stimuli are contingent on 
the order in which they are presented. Specifically, if different 
orders produce different responses, the "w" parameter cannot be con-
stant, as has been assumed in the integration model (Anderson, 1974). 
Asch (1946), first to investigate this phenomena, found a 
primacy effect when inconsistent sets of trait stimuli were serially 
presented. Specifically, three likable traits followed by three 
disliked traits produced a more favorable impression than the traits 
presented in reverse order. This primacy effect has been found in a 
number of different studies (e.g., Anderson, 1965; Stewart, 1965; 
Anderson & Norman, 1963; Hendrick, 1974). 
Three explanations have been offered for these primacy effects: 
"change in meaning," "attention decrement," and "discounting. 11 The 
first, suggested by Asch (1946), explained the phenomena as due to 
an actual change in meaning of the stimulus traits. For example, 
the trait "intelligent" may be viewed as positive when preceded by 
traits such as "sincere" and "thoughtful," but may be vie\ved 
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negatively when preceded by traits such as "cunning" and "shrewd." 
The change in meaning hypothesis suggests that as a function of con-
text, the scale value of a trait can change. Other studies suggest, 
however, that this hypothesis cannot adequately explain all the data. 
For example, Tesser (1968), defining meaning as ratings on four 
semantic differential scales, found that the "meaning" of traits did 
not change as a function of serial position. As an alternative 
explanation, Tesser suggests the "attention decrement" and "discount-
ing" hypotheses which would entail differences in only the weight 
parameter of traits. Specifically, the attention decrement hypothe-
sis (Anderson, 1965) assumes that the primacy effect is due to a 
progressive decrease in attention over serial positions of a stimulus 
sequence. The discounting explanation assumes that the primacy 
effect is due to a motivated discounting of later information in 
order to resolve affective inconsistency between traits (Anderson, 
1968; Anderson & Jacobson, 1965). 
Although both attention decrement and discounting predict a 
decrease in the weight parameter across a set of traits, the manner 
in which the weights decrease would differ. That is, discounting 
would predict an abrupt change in \veight \vhen the inconsistency was 
introduced. Attention decrement, on the other hand, would predict 
a smooth linear decrease in weights across the trait sets. Hendrick 
and Costantini (1970) tested these predictions and found a smooth 
decrease in weights across inconsistent sets. Again, the attention 
decrement explanation would be in accord with these results. 
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If weights do change across serial presentations of adjectives, 
this suggests that adults are selecting or giving more emphasis to 
earlier appearing adjectives. Anderson (1974) offers two possible 
explanations for this phenomena. First, attention decrement may 
result from a gradual crystalization of the impression across the 
sequence. As the impression becomes increasingly solid, new informa-
tion may be neglected as non-essential. A second possibility is that 
the integration mechanism becomes occupied with processing the ad-
jectives already received so that the later traits have less influ-
ence. Recent empirical evidence, however, casts doubt on this second 
interpretation. Specifically, Hendrick, Costantini, McGarry, and 
McBride (1973) conducted a series of experiments varying the length 
of the interstimulus time interval between traits in a set. The 
intervals varied from essentially zero to five seconds. If subjects 
tended to become preoccupied with processing earlier appearing 
adjectives at the expense of the latter traits, the longer interval 
should remedy this problem and eliminate any primacy effects. 
Results indicated that varying the time interval had no effect on 
the size of the primacy effect. 
The idea of an early crystalization of one's impression as an 
explanation for attention decrement deserves further attention. 
This idea appears particularly attractive in light of other types 
of research that have reported recency effects. Using serial presen-
tations, research on psychophysical judgments (e.g., Weiss & Anderson, 
1969; Anderson, 1973), decision-making (Anderson, 1964; Shantaeau, 
1970, 1972), and attitude change (Anderson, 1959, 1973; Anderson & 
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Farkas, 1973) have all obtained recency effects when the information 
was serially presented. These results are consistent with the 
"crystalization of impressions" explanation for attention decrement. 
That is, the knowledge that one is to make a psychophysical judgment, 
decision, or form an attitude makes salient to the subject the 
necessity of forming an impression based on all available information. 
There is no reason to presume that the information will remain in-
variant throughout the stimulus sequence. 
In person perception types of judgments, however, there is 
reason to presume that the stimulus information describing the person 
will remain constant or invariant. That is, adults have come to 
assume that an individual's personality chara~teristics usually are 
consistent. Thus, if we can form a coherent judgment based on only 
part of the available information, there is no reason to maximally 
attend to any additional information. Attention decrement, then, 
may ensue, accounting for any primacy effects. This interpretation 
also appears consistent with additional research in person perception 
that has found recency effects. That is, using methods that have 
made all the traits in a set salient to subjects, various studies 
have successfully eliminated the primacy effect. For example, A."lder-
son and Hubert (1963) had subjects concomitantly recall the adjectives 
and found recency rather than primacy effects on the overall lika-
bility judgments. Stewart (1965) also found recency effects when 
subjects made judgments after each trait was presented, and Hendrick 
and Costantini (1970) found these same effects \vhen adjectives were 
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pronounced by subjects as they were presented. These studies share 
in common the fact that response requirements necessitated that the 
subjects attend to all the available information, thereby attenuating 
any early crystalization process. 
Preoperational children, who have not mastered the principle 
of invariance or who have not learned to expect consistencies in 
personality characteristics (e.g., Livesley & Bromley, 1973), may not 
be expected to have an early crystalization of their impressions: 
their attention should not decrease across a series of traits. Con-
sequently, primacy effects would not be predicted. Rather, young 
children might be expected to attend to all the trait information as 
it is presented, and base their impressions on the most salient 
characteristics of the entire set of traits. In sets of equally fre-
quent liked and disliked traits, the most recently preseDted infor-
mation would be expected to be most salient. Thus, recency effects 
might characterize preoperational children's judgments, rega:t;"dl~ss · 
of response requirements. 
The idea that recency effects do shape young children's 
impressions is also consistent with other research. For example, 
Cole, Frankelt, and Sharp (1971) found recency effects for young 
children in free recall; Kun, Parsons and Ruble (1974) in achievement 
judgments; and Feldman, Klosson, Parsons, Rholes, and Ruble (1976) 
in moral judgments. Theref~re, it w·ould not be surprising if recency 
effects also were found in the judgments of young children given a 
serial presentation of trait information. Of course, for larger 
sets of traits, recency effects for younger children may also be due 
to memory limitations. 
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Study III was designed to investigate whether different order 
effects are found for subjects of different cognitive levels. 
Specifically, for adults and concrete operational children, who have 
mastered the invariance principle, it might be predicted that they 
will give greater weight to earlier appearing information (i.e., a 
primacy effect). Preoperational children, not expecting any consis-
tency in trait descriptions and limited in their recall abilitie_s, 
would be expected to give more weight to later appearing traits (i.e.> 
a recency effect). Any differences in effects between cognitive 
levels again would indicate variations in valuation processes. 
Summary 
In summary, three studies are proposed investigating the 
development of social judgment processes. Study I will investigate 
whether children and adults "integrate" trait information in the 
same manner. It is predicted that the preoperational child's failure 
to master the principle of invariance will attenuate an equally-
weighted averaging operation. Specifically, preoperational children 
will base their judgments on the most salient or evaluatively fre-
quent information in the stimulus sequence. The older concrete 
operational and formal operational subjects will attempt to integrate 
any inconsistent information into their final judgment by following 
an equally-weighted averaging operation. 
Since differences in judgments between cognitive levels may 
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not only imply variations in "integration" processes, but "valuation" 
operations as well, two further studies are proposed. Study II in-
vestigates whether "set-size" effects are generalizable to all cog-
nitive levels. Limited by the absoluteness of their perspective and 
the broad implications traits may carry, preoperational children may 
not form impressions based on the set size. Specifically, increasing 
the number of traits may reduce the weight associated with traits 
in the impression formation process. For older concrete operational 
and formal operational subjects, these weights would be expected to 
be constant across increasing set sizes, while judgments become more 
polarized. 
Study III investigates whether "primacy" effects are generaliz-
able to all cognitive levels. Since preoperational children may not 
have learned to expect a consistency in trait descriptions, any 
early "crystalization" of their impression may not occur. This would 
attenuate any primacy effects. A recency effect might be predicted 
on the basis that the preoperational child's limited recall abilities 
may bias judgments towards the most recently presented information. 
For the older concrete and formal operation subjects, primacy effects 
would be predicted on the basis of the early crystalization hypothesis. 
GENERAL HETHOD 
Subjects_ 
One hundred forty....:four children and adults, seventy-t,.;ro males 
and seventy-two females, from the Chicago area served as subjects in 
three studies. Forty-eight children defined as "preoperational" 
(mean age approximately 6~6 years) and forty-eight defined as "con-
crete" (mean age approximately 9,4 years) by performances on Piagetian 
tasks individually experienced and responded to a variety of stimulus 
conditions. These children were attending first and third grade 
classes in the Evanston Public School System, District 65 (See Appen-
dix 6). Forty--eight college students, who were assumed to be at 
the "formal" operational level, also served as subjects in the same 
stimulus conditions. These students were enrolled in·introductory 
psychology classes at Loyola University and participated in the 
studies for course credit. 
Piagetian Tasks 
Prior to the presentation of the stimulus conditions in all 
three studies, the younger two groups of subjects were individually 
tested to determine the Piagetian phase of cognitive development they 
had achieved. Because mastery of the principle of invariance and a 
non-egocentric orientation may both be integral to the selection 
and organization of stimulus information, the tasks used were meant 
to determine the degree to which the children had acquired these 
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abilities. Specifically, the tasks used determined whether conser-
vation of mass was maintained (invariance test), and whether the 
child could shift social perspectives (egocentrism test). It was 
assumed that mastery of the principle of invariance in physical 
objects could be applied to the perception of people (c.f., Livesley 
& Bromley, 1973). 
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Invariance test. The first task, involving the assessment of 
"conservation of mass," was performed by initially presenting each 
child with two identical balls of clay. After the child had been 
instructed to examine the balls, the child was asked whether the 
balls contained the same amount of clay. If the child did not think 
so, the opportunity was given to add or subtract clay from the balls 
so that they were of equal quantity. The experimenter then changed 
one of the balls to a sausage shape while the child watched. The 
child was again asked whether the ball and sausage contained the same 
amount of clay. If the child said that they did, he or she was 
asked to explain \vhy. The child was classified as "passing" the 
invariance test if a correct answer was given. 
Egocentrism test. The second task involved assessing whether 
the children could take the social perspectives of other people. The 
inability to take another's perspective is one of the prim~ry char-
acteristics of egocentrism (Flavell, 1968). Before children can 
determine what other people are thinking or feeling, they must "de-
center" from their own egocentric thoughts and feelings. This ability 
was tested by a role-taking task developed by Flavell (1968). 
Specifically, a series of seven pictures was shown to each child, 
and the subject was asked to tell a story which the pictures illus-
trated. Three specific pictures were subsequently removed and the 
child was requested to predict a story another person would tell who 
had not seen the entire set of seven pictures. The pictures were 
constructed so that the entire series suggested a certain story, 
while the series of four suggested quite another different story. 
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This task constituted a role-taking problem under the following 
interpretation. During the second part of the task, the child pre-
sumably viewed the four picture sequence from a cognitive perspective 
different from a person naive to the seven picture sequence. This 
"naive person" is supposed to see the pictures in isolation and "read" 
them for the dominant story line which they suggest. The egocentric 
child, on the other hand, understands the new set of pictures simply 
as elements taken from a previous whole (i.e., the seven picture 
sequence) and construes them in terms of their meaning within the 
whole. The subjects' role-taking task, therefore, is believed to 
consist of suppressing their own perspectives in favor of participat-
ing in the "naive other's" so as to interpret the data as the other 
might interpret them. 
The sequence of seven pictures (See Appendix A) was.intended to 
elicit stories something like the following: a vicious dog chases a 
terrified boy who finds refuge by climbing a nearby tree; once 
secure there, and with the dog abandoning the chase, he takes advan-
tage of the kind of tree he happens to be in and eats an apple. The 
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four picture sequence was created by deleting cards 2, 3, and 5 (the 
only cards which depict a threatening dog) leaving cards 1, 2, 6 and 
7. This set of pictures was designed to elicit a very different 
story, of which the following might be an example: a boy finds an 
apple tree, climbs up to get an apple, and sits there eating it. The 
dog shown in the third picture in the sequence (card 6) is simply 
part of the background and of no relevance to the story. The instruc-
tions and procedures used were the following: 
"Here are a series of seven pictures which tell a story." 
The cards then were placed in the proper sequence on the 
table. "You tell me what's going on. Begin here at the 
beginning." Once the child had told a story, he or she was 
instructed, "Now pretend you are someone else (perhaps a 
friend) who hasn't seen all of the pictures, but only these 
four." Cards 2, 3, and 5 then were removed. "Tell me a 
story you think your friend would tell if he (she) sa1:v 
these four pictures." 
On the basis of the second stories the children told, they were 
classified as "egocentric" (not passing the task), or "non-egocentric" 
(passing the task). That is, children were classified as "non-ego-
centric" if they told the "correct" four picture story, making no 
reference to fear or the dog being the motive for climbing the tree. 
Children were classified as "egocentric" if they made a specific 
reference to fear or the dog as a motive, or did so during further 
questioning. 
Cognitive classifications. If the child performed consistently 
at one level across both tasks, it was assumed that the child was 
operating at that cognitive level. That is, children were classified 
as "preoperational" if they failed both the conservation and ego-
centrism tasks, and "concrete" if both tasks were passed. Those 
children passing only. one test were dropped from the study. The 
responses of the children to the stimulus manipulations then were 
included in the final analyses as the operational definition of 
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"level of cognitive development." The procedure for the presentations 
of the tasks was similar for all three studies and occurred prior to 
the presentation of the experimental conditions. 
STUDY I 
Method 
The purpose of Study I was to determine whether preoperational 
children differed from older concrete and formal subjects in their 
integration of information. Specifically, it was predicted that an 
"equally--.;"eighted average" formula would best model concrete and 
formal operational judgments, while an "unequally-weighted average" 
model \vould best reflect preoperational judgments. 
Design. Twenty-four subjects (twelve males and twelve females) 
at each of the three levels of cognitive development individually 
heard and responded to five sets of four trait adjectives. The order 
of trait set presentations was counterbalanced across subjects in a 
latin-square design. Each set consisted of one of the five possible 
combinations of positive and/or negative traits (e.g., PPPP; PNPP; 
NPNP; NNPN; 1~NN). For each subject the order of traits within a 
set was randomized. Further, half of the subjects at each cognitive 
level were presented with evaluatively replicated trait sets (i.e., 
two different sets of positive and negative traits were used), and 
two speakers were used to present the trait sets. Finally, subjects 
tested in Study I also were used in Study III. Thus, the order of 
presentation of studies was alternated across subjects. The design 
of Study I can be summarized as a three (cognitive level of develop-
ment) by t\vO (trait replication) by two (sex of subject) by two 
(speaker) by five (trait sets) factorial. 
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Stimulus materials. Ten liked (i.e., positive) and ten dis-
liked (i.e., negative) traits were selected from Hendrick, Hoving, 
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and Franz's (1974) list of children's likability ratings of trait 
adjectives. The selection of traits was made on the basis of non-
significant variations in ratings across kindergarten, second, fourth, 
and sixth grades. 
Each of the five trait sets that the subjects heard consisted 
of different adjectives randomly selected from the list of traits 
(See Appendix D). Replication sets used the same adjectives with the 
only stipulation being that any adjective appearing in one evaluative 
order of traits could not appear in its replication. Thus, any sub-
ject did not hear a given adjective more than once. 
Prior to presentation of the five experimental trait sets, a 
practice set of four randomly selected traits was introduced to 
acquaint the subjects with the mode of stimulus presentation and the 
dependent variables. 
Stimulus presentation. Prior to presentation of the stimulus 
information, subjects were given a brief introduction in which they 
were told that the experimenter was going to tell them what a boy is 
like and they were to guess hmv much they think they would like or 
dislike him. Each subject heard and responded to six sets (1 prac-
tice, 5 experimental) of four adjectives. Each set was preceded by 
a different boy's name. For example, "Joey is nice, kind, smart, 
good." Children, additionally, were instructed that the boy named 
was someone they did not know, although this may not have been fully 
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understood by all of the children. Traits were presented by tape 
recordings prepared by two different male speakers (speaker condition). 
Each trait was played to the subjects at approximately one second 
intervals. After the set of four traits was presented, subjects were 
asked to make a variety of judgments comprising the dependent vari-
ables. 
Dependent variables. Immediately after presentation of each 
set of trait adjectives, subjects were asked to respond to two al-
ternately presented scales. Recently, Buchanan and Thompson (1973) 
and Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, and Farnill (1973) have convincingly 
shown the technical advantages of using rating scales in developmental 
studies of judgments. The first scale used was a modified version of 
a pictoral rating scale developed by Ernest (1976) for use with 
children. This instrument portrays two sets of pictures, reflecting 
likable and dislikable personality characteristics. Specifically, 
the "likable" set portrays a boy appearing happy and the "dislikable" 
set a boy appearing angry. It was an assumption that the pictures 
reflect the affective reactions to the trait stimuli. Each set 
consists of three pictures similar in all respects except size. 
Once the subject had expressed liking or disliking for the "target 
set," the appropriate set of pictures was randomly displayed paired 
with labels that the experimenter verbally presented. For example, 
the three "like" pictures in Set 1 (See Appendix B) might randomly 
have been presented in order of diminishing size, and appropriately 
labeled as "like him a whole lot; like him; like him a little bit." 
The subject then would be asked to point to the picture and verbally 
state how "liked" was the target person. Assigning a value to each 
picture established a bi-polar six-point scale. 
38 
The second dependent measure, revised and shortened by the 
author, was initially developed for a study using children by Morrison 
and Mancuso (1974). The Behavioral Prediction Test (BPT) consists 
of five pairs of pictures. Each pair depicts a stick figure engaging 
in a good and bad behavior in a variety of home situations. Subjects 
were asked to indicate which behaviors the stimulus characters would 
engage in. Subjects indicated their choices by pointing to the 
illustrated behaviors that they would expect from the actors described 
by the trait adject1ves (See Appendix C). 
Results 
Subject~. Seventy-two children and adults were tested with 
the experimental tasks. Twenty-four subjects were classified into 
each of the three levels of cognitive development (i.e., preoperation-
al, concrete, formal). On the basis of chronological age, two 
children 'vere expected to be operating at a preoperational level, but 
passed the Role-Taking Task (RTT) indicating that they may have been 
operating at the concrete operational level. In accordance with the 
classification criteria, these children were excluded from the study 
and two other children substituted \vho had failed both tasks. The 
subjects' mean ages are presented in Table 1, broken-down by cognitive 
level and sex. 
Likability judgments: ANOVA. A three (cognitive level of 
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TABLE 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Ages of Subjects 
Participating in Studies I and III 
Cognitive Level n Mean Standard Deviation 
Preoperational 
male 12 78.50 4.60 
female 12 75.42 4.38 
both 24 76.96 4.67 
Concrete Operational 
male 12 111.42 3.53 
female 12 112.50 5.12 
both 24 111.96 4.34 
Formal Operational 
ma1e 12 225.08 13.53 
female 12 229.67 8.08 
both 24 227.38 11.15 
Note. Means and standard deviations are presented by months. 
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development) by two (trait replication) by two (speaker) by two (sex 
of subject) by five (trait sequence) analysis of variance with sub-
jects repeated across sequences was used to analyze the judgments of 
liking. The analysis of variance summary table along with the means 
and standard deviations of the ratings made by the respondents at the 
three cognitive levels are presented in Tables 2 and 3~ respectively. 
Examination of Table 2 reveals no significant main effects for 
level of cognitive development, trait replication, speaker, or sex of 
subject. However, a significant main effect was found for trait 
sequence, F(4,192) 81.48, ~ <.001. As the number of positive traits 
in a sequence increased so did ratings of liking. An unexpected 
interaction also was found between trait sequence and trait replica-
tion, I(4,192) = 12.00, £ <.01. That is, replications elicited 
different patterns of responses across the trait sequences. In 
replication 1 the PNNN set was rated higher (i.e., more dislikable) 
than the NNNN trait sequence. This is the reverse of replication 2 
ratings, and what had been predicted. In replication 2 the PPPN set 
was rated higher than the PPNN sequence. This is the reverse of 
replication 1 and what also had been hypothesized. It is possible 
that these differences \vere due to the trait "terrible" which appeared 
in the PNNN sequence in replication 1 and the PPPN sequence in 
replication 2. Although in replication 1 the mean scale value of 
the PNNN sequence was slightly gerater than the NNNN sequence, the 
denotative meaning of the trait "terrible" may have polarized judg-
ments more negatively than the normative ratings might have indicated. 
TABLE 2 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability Ratings - Study I 
Source 
Cognitive Level (A) 
Trait Replication (B) 
Speaker (C) 
Sex of Subject (D) 
Ax B 
A X c 
A X D 
B X C 
B X D 
C X D 
Ax B X c 
Ax B x D 
A X C X D 
B x c X D 
A X B X c X D 
Error (bet>.veen) 
Trait Sequence (E) 
AxE 
B X E 
C X E 
D X E 
A X B X E 
A X c X E 
A X D X E 
B X c X E 
B x D X E 
C X D X E 
Ax B X C X E 
Ax B X D X E 
Ax C X D X E 
B X C X D X E 
A X BxCxDxE 
Error (within) 
~-.E. <.05 
**E. <.01 
***E. <.001 
MS df F 
1. 43 2 .27 
.62 1 .12 
.07 1 .07 
.00 1 .oo 
4.13 2 .79 
.48 2 .09 
3.34 2 .64 
5.14 1 .98 
4.67 1 .89 
.14 1 .03 
10.54 2 2.02 
3.01 2 .58 
1.81 2 .35 
7.22 1 1.38 
10.53 2 2.01 
5.23 4~ 
122.09 4 81. 48*i:* 
1.28 8 .86 
17.98 4 12.00** 
.44 4 • 30 
.16 4 .10 
3.25 8 2.17* 
2.07 8 1. 38 
.55 8 .37 
1.46 4 . 97 
.57 4 • 38 
.91 4 .61 
1.94 8 1.29 
. 90 8 .60 
1.62 8 1.08 
.53 4 .35 
1.14 8 .76 
1.50 192 
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TABLE 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for likability Ratings 
Broken-down by Cognitive level and Sequence--Study I 
Cognitive level Trait Seguence pppp PPPN PPNN PNNN NNNN 
Preoperational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 1. 42 2.83 4.17 5.08 4.00 
(standard deviation) ( .79) (2. 08) (2 .17) (1.16) (1. 76) 
Replication 2 (n=12) 
mean 1.42 3.50 2.17 3.67 4.67 
(standard deviation) (1.16) (2 .02) (1. 90) (1. 97) (1. 78) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 1.42 3.17 3.17 4.38 4.33 
(standard deviation) ( .97) (2.04) (2. 24) (1. 74) (1. 76) 
Concrete Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 1. 25 2.08 3.33 4.67 4.75 
(standard deviation) ( .45) ( .90) (1. 82) (1.50) (1. 22) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 1.17 3.33 3.83 4.25 5.08 
(standard deviation) ( . 39) (1. 78) (1. 75) (1. 76) (1. 50) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 1. 21 2. 71 3.58 4.46 4.92 
(standard deviation) ( .41) (1. 52) (1. 77) (1. 61) (1. 35) 
Formal Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 1.83 2.67 3.92 5.42 4.08 
(standard deviation) (1. 53) (1. 23) (1.16) ( .79) (1. 31) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 1. 33 3.75 3.25 3.25 5.58 
(standard deviation) ( .78) (1. 36) (1. 48) ( .96) ( .51) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 1.58 3.21 3.58 4.33 4.83 
(standard deviation) (1. 21) (1. 38) (1. 35) (1. 40) (1.24) 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("like him a whole lot") to 6 
("dislike him a whole lot"). 
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Further, since the cognitive level by replication by sequence inter-
action was only marginally significant (£(8,192) = 2.17, ~ <.05), no 
serious problems are created with the interpretation of the results. 
In fact, this interaction may be due to random error since a large 
number of factors were involved in this study. No other interactions 
were significant. 
Likability judgments: planned comparisons. Examination of 
Figure 1 suggests that all three cognitive levels averaged the trait 
information. That is, as the proportion of negative adjectives in a 
sequence increased so did judgments of disliking. Further, trend 
analyses (See Table 3) revealed that a linear trend accounted for 
most of the variation in formal operational responses (F(l,92) = 
82.57, ~ <.001), beyond which no other trends were significant. For 
concrete subjects, both linear (£(1,92) = 166.67, ~ <.001) and 
quadratic trends (F(l,92) = 6.15, ~ <.05) were significant. Finally, 
while a linear trend also Has significant for preoperational responses 
(F(l,92) = 54.49, ~ <.001), so were the quadratic (F(l,92) 4.44, 
~ <.05) and quartic trends (£(1,92) 4.61, ~ <.05). 
The &~OVA was made to check for main effects and interactions 
among the various factors. However, specific hypotheses relating to 
differences in ratings between sequences are tested by planned 
comparisons (~viner, 1971). This approach is permissable since 
differences in ratings within cognitive levels were predicted a 
priori. Specifically, for none of the cognitive levels was the 
difference between PNNN and NNNN sequences significant, (formal:£ 
(1,192) = 2.00, ~ >.10; concrete: F(l,l92) = 1.68, ~ >.10; 
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preoperational: .f(l,l92) = 11.69, 2- <.01). 
An analysis also was made of the degree to which subjects 
"polarized" responses. That is, deviation scores from the midpoint 
of the likability scale (i.e., 3.5) were calculated. At-test 
revealed that the ratings of the preoperational children were more 
polarized than the ratings of the grouped concrete and formal sub-
jects (~(70) = 2.90, 2- <.01). Although in Figure 1 it appears that 
the mean ratings of preoperational children were less polarized than 
older subjects, the greater degree of polarization of preoperational 
children stems from the way that their scores were distributed. 
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That is, the combination of both extremely positive and extremely 
negative judgments resulted in the mean ratings of preoperational 
subjects being less polarized. Differences in polarized ratings 
between consistently positive (PPPP) and consistently negative (NNNN) 
sequences were significant for all cognitive levels (formal: ~(23) = 
2.40, 2- <.05; concrete: ~(23) = 2.88, ~ <.01; preoperational: ~(23) = 
2.41, ~ <.05). Consistently positive information was polarized more 
toward the likable end of the scale than NNNN sequences were polarized 
toward the dislikable end. 
Likability judgments: response distribution. Although the 
pattern of mean ratings across the sequences appeared similar for 
the three levels of cognitive development, differences in response 
distributions may have produced the similar results (See Table 4). 
It was hypothesized that in evaluatively mixed sequences the most 
evaluatively frequent traits would be most salient to preoperational 
TABLE 4 
Percent Usage of Likability Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Trait Sequence-Study I 
Cognitive Percent ResEonses Across Sequences 
Likability Category Level ppppa PPPNb PPNNc PNNNd NNNNe 
-- -- -- --
preoperational 79.2% 33.3% 37.5% 12.5% 8.3% 
"like him a whole lot" concrete 79.2% 20.8% 12.5% 8.3% 4.2% 
formal 75.0% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
preoperational 8.3% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 12.5% 
"like him" concrete 20.8% 37.5% 25.0% 8.3% 4.2% 
formal 4.2% 29.2% 29.2% 12.5% 4.2% 
preoperational 8.3% 25.0% 8.3% 20.8% 12.5% 
"like him a little bit" concrete 0.0% 16.7% 12.5% 4.2% 0.0% 
formal 16.7% 20.8% 20.8% 16.7% 16.7% 
preoperational 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 
"dislike him a little bit" concrete 0.0% 4.2% 8.3% 20.8% 25.0% 
formal 0.0% 20.8% 20.8% 25.0% 8.3% 
preoperational 4.2% 8.3% 4.2% 20.8% 20.8% 
"dislike him" concrete 0.0% 16.7% 25.0% 25.0% 20.8% 
formal 0.0% 16.7% 20.8% 16.7% 33.3% 
preoperational 0.0% 25.0% 33.3% 37.5% 37.5% 
"dislike him a whole lot" concrete 0.0% 4.2% 16.7% 33.3% 45.8% 
formal 4.2% 4.2% 8.3% 29.2% 37.5% 
ax2(8) = 11.28, £ >.10 cx2 (10) = 25.65, £ <.01 ex2 (10) = 11.79, £ >.10 
bx2 (10) = 22.38, £ <.05 dx2(10) = 10.85, £ >.10 ~ 0' 
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children and, thus, determine responses. However, it is possible 
that in mixed sequences the negative trait or traits are most salient 
(c.f., Hamilton & Zanna, 1972). Judgments based on such sequences 
as PPPN then may be absolute, but in the negative direction. This 
may be determined by examining the distribution of polarized or 
extreme responses. Specifically, the most extreme response categor-
ies of "like him a whole lot" and "dislike him a whole lot" can be 
combined, while the less extreme response categories are ignored. 
Table 5 shows the percentages of subjects across trait sequences using 
the two extreme categories. Results suggest that preoperational 
children are absolute in their judgments as evidenced by the high 
percentages of polarized judgments. Examining the PPPP and PPPN 
sequences suggests that although the mean ratings of these sequences 
were significantly different, high percentages of preoperational 
children used the extreme response categories when making their judg-
ments. Specifically, 79.2% of the preoperational subjects rated the 
PPPP sequences as either "like him a whole lot" or "dislike him a 
whole lot," while 58.3% of the children also made polarized responses 
to the PPPN sequences. This finding is in contrast to the ratings 
made by the concrete and formal operational subjects who were signi-
ficantly less likely to rate the PPPN sequences in a polarized manner 
(x 2 (2) = 12.39, £ <.01). That is, while 58.3% of the preoperational 
children gave polarized ratings to the PPPN sequences, only 25.0% of 
the concrete and 12.5% of the formal operational responses to the PPPN 
sequences were polarized. It then appears that although the mean 
differences between PPPN and PPPP sequences were significant for all 
TABLE 5 
Percent Polarized Likability Ratings by Trait Sequence - Study I 
Cognitive Level Trait Sequences ppppa PPPNb PPNNc PNNNd NNNNe 
Preoperational 79.2% 58.3% 70.8% 50.0% 45.8% 
Concrete 79.2% 25.0% 29.2% 41.6% 50.0% 
Formal 79.2% 12.5% 8.3% 29.2% 37.5% 
Note. Polarized responses are classified as judgments 2of either 
"like a whole lot" or "dislike a whole lot." x s are based 
on polarized judgments versus other judgments (i.e., non-
polarized judgments). 
ax2(2) 0.00, .E.>.1o 
bx2(2) 12.39, .E. <.01 
c/(2) 21.07' .E. <.001 
di(2) 2.21, E. > .10 
ei(2) .78, .E. >.10 
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cognitive levels, the processes by which preoperational children 
arrived at their judgments was different from the processes used by 
older subjects. 
Examining the distribution of responses for the PNNN and NNNN 
sequences (See Tables 4 and 5), reveals small differences in category 
usage among cognitive levels. As expected, neither the chi squares 
for the PNNN or the NNNN sequences were significant. Small differ-
ences in category usage also were found across the PNNN and NNNN 
sequences, reflecting the non-significant differences in mean ratings 
for each of the cognitive levels. In fact, for preoperational 
children there was a slight decrease in polarized judgments between 
the PN~~ (50.0%) and NNNN sequences (45.8%). 
Although for the PNNN sequences all subjects appeared to be 
"absolute" in their judgments (perhaps indicating a ceiling effect), 
responses to the PPNN sequences suggest a different trend. That is, 
for the PPNN sequences, 70.8% of the preoperational children rated 
these sequences in either a polarized positive or negative manner. 
This is in contrast to the concrete and formal operational responses 
of which only 29.2% and 8.3%, respectively, were absolute Cx 2 (2) = 
21.07, ~ <.001). These findings may reflect the preoperational 
children's inability to integrate inconsistent information. When 
presented with evaluatively inconsistent traits, the preoperational 
children appeared to judge others in an absolute manner. Older 
concrete and formal operational subjects may have taken account of 
sequence inconsistencies by making less polarized judgments. 
Likability judgments: ordinal positions. Analyses also were 
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made to determine whether the ordinal positions in which the sequences 
were presented affected responses. A three (cognitive level of de-
velopment) by five (latin-.square position) analysis of variance was 
made. Results suggest no significant effects for either cognitive 
level or the order in which the trait sequences were presented (See 
Table 6). In addition, no significant effect was found for the 
interaction of these two variables. 
To avoid any confounds with the order of presentations of the 
likability and behavioral prediction scales, these scales alternately 
were presented across sequences. For example, a given subject might 
receive the likability scale followed by the prediction scale for the 
first sequence, the prediction scale followed by the likability 
scale for the subsequent sequence, and so on. A t-test revealed no 
significant difference in likability ratings as a function of scale 
order (~(70) = .11, E. >.10). 
Since subjects who participated in Study 1 also participated in 
Study III, the order in which the studies were presented was alter-
nated across subjects. No significant differences in judgments of 
liking were found as a function of study order, ~(70) = .26, E >.10. 
Behavioral predictions. The modified Behavioral Prediction 
Test (BPT) was designed to further reflect judgments of liking. 
That is, part of the reason for forming impressions of others is to 
facilitate predictions of future behaviors (Kelly, 1955). The under-
lying premise being that liking is closely linked with behavioral 
expectations. We not only like those who do good things, but implic-
itly base that liking on the assumption that the person will continue 
TABLE 6 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability 
Ratings Based on Sequence Position - Study I 
Source 
Cognitive Level (A) 
Latin-Square Position (B) 
Ax B 
Error 
MS 
.29 
.94 
. 55 
1.04 
df 
2 
4 
8 
57 
F 
.28 
.91 
.53 
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to behave in positive ways. Of course, to the extent that our be-
havioral expectations are violated, our judgments will be altered. 
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In the strictest interpretation of Anderson's averaging model, behav-
ioral predictions cannot be made from the same stimulus information on 
which the judgments of liking were based. That is, the model stipu-
lates that judgments be made on the same evaluative dimension which 
the stimuli were rated. Since the traits were rated for "likability" 
and not "predicted goodness," behavioral predictions are a step 
removed from the stimulus information. However, to the extent that 
liking and behavioral predictions are psychologically linked, the 
stimulus information should determine the subjects' behavioral pre-
dictions. 
The BPT was scored so that low scores would reflect more posi-
tive predictions than high scores. Correlations then could be calcu-
lated between the six-point likability scale and the six-point 
prediction scale. Since the lm.;r variation in responses within 
sequences did not allow correlations to be made for each of the five 
sequences, correlations were calculated for individual subjects across 
sequences. That is, Spearman's rho correlations were based on five 
pairs of ranked scores resulting in three degrees of freedom. For 
preoperational children, correlations ranged from .025 to 1.0 with 
a median of .850. For concrete subjects, rho correlations ranged 
from .450 to 1.0 with a median of .862, while for formal operational 
subjects correlations ranged from .075 to .957 with a median of .838. 
Clearly, for all cognitive levels the scales were highly related. 
Behavioral predictions: ANOVA. As with the likability 
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judgments, a three (cognitive level of development) by two (trait 
replication) by t'vo (speaker) by t\vO (sex of subject) by five (trait 
sequence) analysis of variance with subjects repeated across sequences 
was used to analyze the behavioral predictions. The analysis of 
variance summary table along with the means and standard deviations 
of the predictions are presented in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. 
The effects found for the behavioral predictions generally 
paralleled those found for the likability ratings. Specifically, no 
significant main effects were found for trait replication, speaker, 
or sex of subject. There was a significant main effect for cognitive 
level, hmvever, which was not found for the judgments of liking. 
Preoperational children made significantly more positive predictions 
than the combined concrete and formal operational subjects (~(70) 
2.52, .E_ <.05), while no difference was found between concrete and 
formal ratings (~(46) = .85, .E_ >.10). As expected, the main effect 
for trait sequence again was significant, I(4,192) = 60.41, .E_ <.001. 
As the proportion of negative traits in a sequence increased, so did 
the number of negative behavioral predictions. 
The only significant interaction was between replication and 
trait sequence, !(4,192) 11.10, .E_ <.01. This interaction and 
pattern of responses was simila.r to that found for the ratings of 
liking. That is, in replication 1 the P~~ sequence elicited more 
negative behavioral predictions than the ~~N sequence, while in 
replication 2 the PPPN sequence evoked more negative predictions than 
the PPNN sequence. This pattern of responses for predictions, in 
part, may have been due to the denotative meaning of the trait 
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TABLE 7 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions - Study I 
Source MS df F 
Cognitive Level (A) 17.77 2 3.67* 
Trait Replication (B) 2.50 1 .52 
Speaker (C) .04 1 .01 
Sex of Subject (D) .71 1 .15 
Ax B 9.56 2 1.97 
A X c 2.27 2 .47 
Ax D 10.00 2 2.07 
B x C 16.04 1 3.31 
B x D 2.18 1 .45 
C x D 1. 34 1 .28 
Ax B X c .05 2 .01 
A X B X D 10.52 2 2.17 
Ax C X D 13.02 2 2.69 
B X C X D 3.21 1 .66 
Ax B x C X D 3.54 2 .73 
Error (between) 4.84 48 
Trait Sequence (E) 141.65 4 60.41*** 
A X E 2.59 8 1.10 
B x E 26.03 4 11.10** 
C x E 3.42 4 1.46 
D X E 1.50 4 .64 
AxBx E 3.00 8 1.28 
A X c X E 2.48 8 1.06 
AxDx E 2.42 8 1.03 
B X C X ., 3.34 4 1.42 L 
B X D x E 3.08 4 1. 31 
C X D X E 1. 70 4 • 73 
Ax B XC X E 1. 28 8 .55 
Ax B x D X E 1.65 8 .70 
A X c X D X E 1. 40 8 .60 
B X c X D X E .43 4 .18 
Ax B X c X D X E 2. 72 8 1.16 
Error (within) 2.34 192 
*.E_<.05 
**p <. 01 
***p_ <.001 
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TABLE 8 
Means and Standard Deviations for Predictions 
Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence - Study I 
Cognitive Level Trait Seguence PPPP PPPN PPNN PNNN NNNN 
Preoperational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean .67 1.92 3.08 3.42 3.08 
standard deviation (1. 44) (1.98) (2 .11) (1. 98) (2.02) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean .25 1.58 .75 2.08 3.42 
standard deviation ( .62) (2 .15) (1. 60) (2 .27) (2.06) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean .46 1. 75 1.92 2. 75 . 3.25 
standard deviation (1.10) (2.03) (2.18) (2.19) (2.00) 
Concrete Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean .08 1.00 2.67 4.42 4.08 
standard deviation ( .29) (1. 76) (2. 27) (1.50) (1.56) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean .25 2.92 2.50 3.00 4.58 
standard deviation ( .87) (1. 93) (2 .07) (2.22) (1. 44) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean .17 1.96 2.58 3.71 4.33 
standard deviation ( .64) (2.05) (2.12) (1. 99) (1. 49) 
Formal Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean .33 1.42 3.50 4.50 3.83 
standard deviation (1.15) (1. 50) (1. 93) (1.00) (1. 03) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean • 33 3.83 2.25 2.83 4.92 
standard deviation ( .89) (1. 47) (1.96) (2.12) ( .29) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean .33 2.62 2.88 3.67 4.38 
standard deviation (1. 01) (1. 91) (2.01) (1. 83) ( .92) 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 0 (no negative predictions) to 5 (five 
negative predictions). 
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"terrible." Since the replication by sequence by cognitive level 
interaction was not significant (!(8,192) = 1.92, ~ >.10), variations 
in predictions among cognitive levels are not confounded with repli-
cations. 
Behavioral predictions: planned comparisons. As found for 
the likability ratings, behavioral predictions appeared to be a func-
tion of the proportion of positive and negative traits comprising 
the stimulus sequences (See Figure 2). That is, for each of the 
cognitive levels, as the proportion of negative traits in a sequence 
increased, so did the number of negative behavioral predictions. 
Trend analyses indicated only the linear trends to be significant 
(preoperational: F(l,92) = 58.38, ~ <.001; concrete: F(l,92) = 229.91, 
~ <.001; formal: F(l,92) 77.54, ~ <.001). 
Planned comparisons again were used for subsequent analyses. 
It had been predicted that differences in predictions would be found 
bet\veen the PPPP and PPPN sequences for concrete and formal opera-
tional subjects, but not for preoperational children. Comparisons 
revealed significant differences for all cognitive levels (preoper-
ational: !(1,192) = 8.54, ~ <.01; concrete: !(1,192) = 16.43, £ <.01; 
formal: !(1,192) = 26.88, ~ <.01). Similarly, it had been predicted 
that differences in behavioral predictions between PNNN and NNNN 
sequences ~vould be found for older concrete and formal subjects, but 
not for preoperational children. For none of the cognitive levels 
vlere these differences significant (preoperational: !(1,192) = 1.28, 
~ >.10; concrete: !(1,192) = 2.00, ~ >.10; formal: !(1,192) = 2.57, 
~ > .10). Further, for none of the cognitive levels \vere the 
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differences between PPPN and PPNN sequences significant (preopera-
tional: !(1,192) = .14, ~ >.10; concrete: !(1,192) = 2.00, ~ >.10; 
formal: !(1,192) .32, ~ >.10). Finally, although the difference 
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between PP~~ and PNNN sequences was significant for concrete subjects 
(!(1,192) = 6.48, ~ <.05), it was not significant for either preoper-
ational (!(1,192) 3.55, ~ >.10) or formal operational subjects 
(!(1,192) = 3.21, ~ >.10). 
Examination also was made of the degree to which subjects 
polarized predictions. Specifically, deviation.scores from the mid-
point of the prediction scale (i.e., 2.5) were calculat~d and analy-
ses performed on these scores. No significant difference in degree 
of polarization was found between preoperational and grouped concrete 
and formal subjects' (~(70) = .23, ~ >.10) ratings. This occurred in 
spite of the fact that the mean prediction ratings of preoperational 
children appeared to be less polarized than the older subjects (See 
Figure 2). Further, no differences in degree of polarization were 
found between PPPP and NNNN sequences for any of the cognitive 
levels (preoperational: !(23) 1.77, ~ >.10; concrete: F(23) = .57, 
~ >.10; formal: f(23) = 2.01, ~ >.10. 
Behavioral predictions: response distribution. Examination of 
Table 9 reveals no significant differences among cognitive levels in 
distribution of responses for any of the trait sequences. The major-
ity of subjects at each cognitive level made consistently positive 
or negative predictions for each of the sequences. This trend is 
most clearly seen in Table 10 which shows that the distribution of 
consistent responses was not significant for any of the sequences. 
TABLE 9 
Percent Usage of PreJiction Frequencies Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Trait Sequence - Study I 
Negative Predictions Cognitive Percent Responses Across Sequences 
Level ppppa PPPNb PPNNc PNNNd NNNNe 
-- --
0 Preoperational 75.0% 37.5% 45.8% 29.2% 16.7% 
Concrete 91.7% 37.5% 29.2% 16.7% 8.3% 
Formal 87.5% 16.7% 20.8% 12.5% 0.0% 
1 Preoperational 16.7% 25.0% 12.5% 8.3% 8.3% 
Concrete 4.2% 16.7% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Formal 4.2% 25.0% 8.3% 4.2% 0.0% 
2 Preoperational 4.2% 12.5% 4.2% 8.3% 12.5% 
Concrete 0.0% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 4.2% 
Formal 0.0% 4.2% 12.5% 8.3% 4.2% 
3 Preoperational 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 
Concrete 4.2% 0.0% 8.3% 4.2% 0.0% 
Formal 4.2% 8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 16.7% 
4 Preoperational 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 12.5% 12.5% 
Concrete 0.0% 12.5% 8.3% 0.0% 12.5% 
Formal 4.2% 25.0% 4.2% 12.5% 16.7% 
5 Preoperational 4.2% 25.0% 25.0% 37.5% 45.8% 
Concrete 0.0% 20.8% 33.3% 66.7% 75.0% 
Formal 0.0% 20.8% 37.5% 54.2% 62.5% 
ax2 (10) = 10.43, ~ >.10 cx2(10) = 6.87, p >.10 ex2(10) = 16.68, p <.10 
bx2 (10) = 14.04, ~ >.10 dx2 (10) = 9.59, ~ >.lo - V1 
1.0 
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TABLE 10 
Percent Consistent Predictions by Trait Sequence - Study I 
Cognitive Level Trait Sequence 
ppppa PPPNb PPNNc PNNNd NNNNe 
Preoperational 79.2% 62.5% 70.8% 66.7% 62.5% 
Concrete Operational 91.7% 58.3% 62.5% 83.4% 83.4% 
Formal Operational 87.5% 37.5% 58.3% 66.7% 62.5% 
Note. Consistent responses are classified as either consistently 
positive or negative predictions. x2s are based on consistent 
judgments versus other judgments (i.e., non-consistent 
judgments). 
ax2(2) = 1.63, .E_ >.10 
bx2(2) 3.46, .E_ >.10 
cx2(2) 
.84, .E_ >.10 
dx2(2) 2.21, .E_ >.10 
ex2 (2) 3.27, .E_ >.10 
It then appears that the linear trends in predictions were due to the 
proportions of subjects making consistently good or bad predictions, 
and not due to within individual variations in predictions. It is 
interesting to note that although the behavioral predictions and 
likability scale ratings were significantly correlated, the response 
pattern of predictions was somewhat different than the distribution 
of likability ratings. The high correlations then may be due to the 
low number of scores correlated and not due to actual parallels in 
cognitive processes. 
Behavioral predictions: ordinal positions. Further analyses 
were made to determine whether the pos-itions in which the sequences 
were presented affected behavioral predictions. Although a signifi-
cant effect was found for cognitive level (F(2,57) = 3.26, ~ <.05), 
no significant effects were found for latin-square position or the 
interaction of the two variables (See Table 11). 
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A t-test also was made to determine any effects of alternating 
the likability and prediction scale presentations. As expected, no 
significant differences in predictions was found (~(70) = .02, ~ >.10). 
In addition, a t-test indicated no significant difference in predic-
tions due to alternating the order in which Study I and Study III 
were presented (~(70) = .31, ~ >.10). 
Conclusions 
Likability judgments. It had been hypothesized that differences 
in information integration processes would be found between preoper-
ational and older concrete and formal operational subjects. That is, 
TABLE 11 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions 
Based on Sequence Position - Study I 
Source 
Cognitive Level (A) 
Latin-Square Position (B) 
A X B 
Error 
*.£. <.05 
MS 
3.56 
1.08 
.61 
1.09 
df 
2 
4 
8 
57 
F 
3.26* 
.99 
.56 
62 
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it was predicted that a simple (equal-weight) average model would 
reflect the judgments of older subjects, while an unequal-weight 
average model would represent preoperational judgments. These differ-
ences would be reflected in variations in ratings both between the 
PPPP and PPPN sequences and between the PNNN and NNNN sequences. 
Specifically, significant differences in ratings between sequences 
were hypothesized for concrete and formal subjects, but not for pre-
operational children. For all cognitive levels the differences be-
tween PPPP and PPPN sequences were significant, while the PNNN and 
NNNN differences were not. These similarities in ratings among cog-
nitive levels might suggest similar integration processes, although 
variations in trend analyses would question this conclusion. That is,. 
while linear trends were significant for all cognitive levels, the 
quadratic and quartic trends also were significant for the preopera-
tional responses. These deviations from linearity are most clearly 
seen in the similar ratings of the PNNN and NNNN sequences and of the 
PPPN and PP~~ sets. A simple averaging model can explain the linear 
trends, but cannot account for the "levelings" of trait sequences. 
That is, for such a model to explain the preoperational pattern of 
responses, the average scale values of the traits would have to change 
between sequences. If it is true that the stimulus values of the 
individual components. do not change across contexts for preoperational 
children, as it has been shown for adults (e.g., Anderson, 1971; 
Kaplan, 1975), then the traits must be differentially weighted. 
Specifically, the average weight of the negative traits in the PNNN 
s.equences must be greater relative to the average weight of the NNNN 
sequences. Further, either the negative traits in the PPPN sequences 
must take on more weight relative to the PPNN sequences, or the posi-
tive information in the PPNN sequences must be weighted higher than 
the PPPN sets. Results then would indicate that preoperational 
children were differentially integrating information. That is, while 
a simple average model might represent concrete and formal responses, 
a weighted average model would be needed to reflect preoperational 
judgments. 
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Differences among cognitive levels in percentages of polarized 
responses to the inconsistent sequences also would suggest variations 
in the integration processes of subjects. That is, the relatively low 
percentages of extreme responses made by the concrete and formal 
operational subjects would suggest that neither the positive or nega-
tive traits were receiving weight disproportionate to their evaluative 
frequencies in the sequences. Rather, the low percentages of polarized 
responses would indicate that concrete and formal subjects were aver-
aging stimuli in a manner that all traits received equal weight. In 
contrast, for preoperational children the relatively high percentages 
of polarized responses to the inconsistent sequences would suggest 
that children were disproportionately assigning weight to either the 
positive or negative information. It had been hypothesized for pre-
operational children that the most evaluatively frequent traits in a 
set would receive the greatest weight and, thus, guide judgments. 
Comparing PNNN and NNNN sequences, equal proportions of preoperational 
children polarized responses in a negative direction. For this to 
occur, the negative traits in the PNNN sequences must have received a 
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greater average weight relative to the NNNN sequences. In contrast, 
a much higher proportion of preoperational children made positively 
polarized responses to the PPPP sets than to the PPPN sequences. This 
would suggest that preoperational children do not ahvays assign the 
greatest weight to the most evaluatively frequent traits. In fact, 
one quarter of the preoperational responses to the PPPN sequences 
were polarized in the negative direction, indicating a greater weight 
assigned to the negative information. For the PPNN sequences, the 
positive and negative traits absolutely guided judgments with about 
equal frequency, again suggesting individual variation among preoper-
ational children in what information is assigned greater weight. Since 
examination of the trait sequences revealed no consistencies in what 
characterized the sets polarized positively or negatively, differences 
in polarization may be due to individual variations in trait meaning. 
The conclusion that preoperational children differentially 
integrate information is of interest for it questions the conclusion 
of Hendrick et al. (1975) that simple averaging is an innate ability. 
Hhen children were presented with inconsistent trait pairs, Hendrick 
et al. found that children would rate the pairs somewhere between 
their isovalent components. These results were not due to subjects 
differentially polarizing responses, since 70 of the 96 set ratings 
were neutral as opposed to absolutely positive or negative. However, 
the possibility still exists that children may only be able to average 
a limited number of stimuli. Since only pairs of traits were used, 
the results of Hendrick et al. then are not conclusive. Presentations 
of multiple trait stimuli then provides a better test of averaging 
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abilities. The finding of the present study that cognitive levels 
differentially integrate information would suggest that simple averag-
ing is not an innate ability, but follows a developmental framework. 
Such a conclusion is consistent with Gollin (1958) and Livesley 
and Bromley (1973) who also concluded that social judgments follow a 
developmental pattern from simple to complex. This pattern may exist 
because of preoperational children's unidimensional perspectives which 
limit their abilities to discern invariant characteristics in others. 
That is, in the same way that preoperational children may learn to 
search for invariant properties in physical objects, they also may 
have to learn to search for consistencies in others' behaviors and 
characteristics. Since preoperational children may not expect the 
characteristics of others to remain invariant, inconsistent informa-
tion may present no "integration problems." That is, impressions 
will be absolutely determined by the most salient information, while 
inconsistent stimuli is simply not attended to or discounted. This 
process may be reflected in a weighted average model where either the 
positive or negative stimuli receive greater weight. Judgments then 
will appear absolute in either the positive or negative direction. 
Hhat information is "salient 11 to subjects \vas not determined in the 
present research, and may result from individual variations in trait 
meaning. 
Once children master the principle of invariance and thereby 
enter the concrete operational phase, impressions will be formed based 
on the consistencies in the behaviors and characteristics of others. 
To the extent that these behaviors and characteristics are constant 
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across time and situations, dispositional attributions and impressions 
can easily be made (Kelley, 1967). However, when confronted with 
inconsistent information, concre.te and formal operational subjects 
still will try to form unified impressions by integrating even dispar-
ate stimuli. Social judgments of older subjects then will be based on 
the entire trait sequence averaged together, with positive and negative 
information weighted proportionately to their evaluative frequency. 
Behavioral predictions. Although parallels in behavioral pre-
dictions would suggest that all cognitive levels similarly were· 
averaging the trait information, the high percentages of consistent 
responses does not support such a conclusion. That is, differences 
in mean ratings across sequences appeared to be due to the proportion 
of consistently positive and negative predictions and not individual 
responsea. Further, it should not necessarily be concluded that sub-
jects cannot integrate inconsistent information when making behavioral 
predictions. The results simply may reflect the format of the behav-
ioral prediction test and not true similarities in cognitive processes. 
That is, when subj~cts are asked to make a series of good or bad judg-
ments there may be a tendency to predict every action independently of 
others and, consequently, remain consistent in one's judgments. For 
example, if presented with a PPPN sequence, a given subject might make 
a positive behavioral prediction. Subsequent choices also may tend to 
be positive if each choice is made independently of the others. The 
failure to find differences in response distributions among cognitive 
levels then may reflect the dichotomous choices of the BPT and not 
necessarily an inability of older concrete and formal subjects to 
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integrate information when making predictions. 
Although in the present study the BPT ratings did not reflect 
likability ratings, earlier developmental research (i.e., Ernest, 
1976) using a similar BPT did find parallels in judgments between the 
two scales. The difference in the "successful" use of the BPT may be 
due to the information on which the ratings were based. That is, 
Ernest (1976) had subjects base their predictions on a series of 
behavioral stimuli (e.g., "John gave Gary a present"). Such a proce-
dure may have made salient to subjects the link between the behavioral 
predictions and the behavioral stimuli on which the predictions were 
to be based. In the present study, the connection between the stimuli 
and behavioral predictions may not have been as clear to subjects, 
since the traits carried no direct behavioral implications. 
STUDY II 
Method 
The purpose of Study II '"as to determine whether "set-s.ize" 
effects generalized to subjects at different levels of cognitive 
development. Specifically, it was predicted that set-size effects 
would not be apparent for preoperational children, while they would 
for the older concrete and formal operational subjects. Differences 
in these effects among cognitive levels would suggest variations 
either in the weighting or valuation processes of subjects, or in the 
initial impression, w0 s 0 • However, since the purpose was to study 
the interaction of cognitive level and set size, it was assumed that 
the initial impression would be the same for all cognitive levels. 
Design. A total of seventy-two subjects who had not partici-
pated in Study I were included in Study II. Twenty-four subjects 
(both males and females) at each of the three levels of cognitive 
development individually heard six sets of trait adjectives. The 
order of trait set presentations was counterbalanced across subjects 
in a latin-square design. Each set was composed of one, three, or six 
consistently likable (i.e., positive) or consistently dislikable 
(i.e., negative) trait adjectives (i.e., P, PPP, PPPPPP, N, NNN, 
NNNNNN). These set sizes were chosen to replicate the Cook et al. 
(1976) study as closely as possible. The order of traits within a 
set was randomized for each subject. Additionally, half of the sub-
jects at each cognitive level heard different-trait sets matched for 
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evaluation (evaluation replication). Traits again were presented by 
tape recordings prepared by two males (speaker condition). Thus, the 
experimental design was a three (cognitive level of development) by 
two (valence of trait sets) by two (trait replications) by two (sex 
of subject) by two (speaker) by three (set sizes) factorial. 
Stimulus materials. The ten liked and ten disliked traits used 
in Study I also were used in Study II. Each of the six trait sets 
each subject heard used the same adjectives with the stipulation that 
any adjective appearing in one set size condition could not appear in 
its replication. All adjectives were randomly selected for the sets. 
Prior to presentation of the six experimental trait sets, a 
practice set of four randomly selected traits was introduced to 
acquaint the subjects with the stimulus presentation procedures and 
the dependent variables. 
The same instructions, mode of stimulus presentation, and de-
pendent variables used in Study I also were used in Study II. 
Results 
Subjects. Seventy-tw·o children and adults who had not partici-
pated in Study I were tested in Study II. Twenty-four subjects were 
classified into each of the three levels of cognitive development. 
As in Study I, preoperational and concrete operational children were 
differentiated on the basis of passing or failing both the RTT and 
the conservation task. All first graders tested failed both tasks, 
indicating that they were operating on a preoperational level. In 
contrast, all third grade children passed both tasks, and, thus were 
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classified as concrete operational. College students again were 
assumed to be operating at the formal operational phase of development. 
Subjects' mean ages and standard deviations are presented in Table 12. 
Likability judgments (positive set sizes): ANOVA. Judgments 
based on positive a~d negative set sizes were analyzed separately, 
since the large number of factors would have made higher order inter-
actions uninterpretable. For positive sets, a three (cognitive level 
of development) by two (trait replication) by two (sex of subject) by 
two (speaker) by three (positive set sizes) analysis of variance with 
subjects repeated across set sizes was used to analyze the judgments 
of liking. The ANOVA summary table along with the means and standard 
deviations of the ratings are presented in Tables 13 and 14, respec-
tively. 
Ps seen in Table 13, the only significant main effect was for 
speakers, I(l,48) = 5.46, £<.OS. This effect was unexpected since 
both speakers were of the same sex (i.e., male) and naive to the 
experimental hypotheses. Ynis effect does not obscure the interpre-
tation of any group differences, however, since speakers did not sig-
nificantly interact with cognitive level. No other significant main 
effects or interactions were found. 
Likability judgments (positive set sizes): planned comparisons. 
Examination of Figure 3 suggests an apparent set-size effect for only 
the formal operational subjects. That is, for formal subjects, 
ratings became increasingly more positive as the number of positive 
traits in a s.et increased. However, trend analyses revealed both the 
linear and quadratic trends to be non-significant for all the 
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TABLE 12 
Means and Standard Deviations for Ages of Subjects 
Participating in Study II 
Cognitive Level n Mean Standard Deviation 
-
Preoperational 
male 12 78.00 3.44 
female 12 77.83 3.69 
both 24 77.92 3.49 
Concrete Operational 
male 12 112.17 7.00 
female 12 114.42 4.54 
both 24 113.29 5.89 
Formal Operational 
rnale 12 232.33 15.52 
female 12 247.67 54.48. 
both 24 240.00 39.95 
Note. Means and standard deviations are presented by months. 
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TABLE 13 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability 
Ratings Based on Positive Traits - Study II 
Source MS df F 
Cognitive Level (A) 1.56 2 1.15 
Trait Replication (B) 4.74 1 3.49 
Speaker (C) 7.41 1 5.46* 
Sex of Subject (D) .07 1 .05 
Ax B .57 2 .42 
Ax D • 35 2 .26 
A X D .80 2 .59 
B x C .91 1 .67 
B x D .02 1 .01 
C x D .17 1 .12 
Ax B x c • 30 2 .22 
A X B X D .57 2 .42 
A X c X D 1.72 2 1. 27 
B X c X D 1.8-5 1 1.36 
A X B X C X D .24 2 .18 
Error (between) 1.36 48 
Positive Set Size (E) 1.26 2 2.24 
A X E 1.09 4 1. 93 
B X E .12 2 .20 
C X E .34 2 .60 
D X E 1.20 2 2.12 
Ax B X 1<' .59 4 1.05 ..... 
A X c X E . 80 4 1.42 
A X D X E .65 4 1.15 
B X c X E .22 2 .40 
B X D X E .70 2 1.24 
c X D X E .68 2 1.20 
AxBxCx E 1.43 4 2.63 
A X B X D X E .78 4 1. 37 
AxCxDx E .22 4 • 38 
B X c X D X E . 36 2 .65 
A X B X c X D X E .28 4 .49 
Error (within) 
*.E. <.05 
TABLE 14 
Means and Standard Deviations for Likability Ratings Based on Positive 
Information Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence - Study II 
Cognitive Level Trait Sequence 
p PPP PPPPPP 
Preoperational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 1.25 1.25 1.17 
(standard deviation) ( .62) ( .62) ( • 39) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 1.58 1. 92 1. 67 
(standard deviation) ( .90) (1.16) (1. 23) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 1.42 1.58 1.42 
(standard deviation) ( .78) ( .97) ( • 93) 
Concrete Operational 
Replication 1 (n=12) 
mean 1.50 1. 75 1. 75 
(standard deviaticn) ( .52) ( .75) (1. 48) 
Replication 2 (n=12) 
mean 1.83 2.17 1.50 
(standard d:eviation) ( .83) ( .94) ( • 80) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 1. 67 1.96 1.62 
(standard deviation) ( .70) ( .86) (1.17) 
Formal Operational 
Replication 1 (n=12) 
mean 2.00 1.58 1.17 
(standard deviation) ( . 95) ( .51) ( .39) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 2.08 1.67 1.67 
(standard deviation) ( .79) (1.15) (1.23) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 2.04 1.62 1.42. 
(standard deviation) ( .86) ( .88) ( .93) 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("like him a whole lot") to 6 
("dislike him a whole lot"). 
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cognitive levels. Planned comparisons of ratings further revealed 
that neither the differences between three positive traits and one 
trait nor the differences between three and six traits were signifi-
cant for any of the cognitive levels. 
Likability judgments (positive set sizes): response distribu-
tion. Another possible approach to determining set-size effects is 
by examination of the frequencies of polarized or extreme responses. 
If set-size effects are operative then ratings should become increas-
ingly more polarized as the number of traits in a set increases. 
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Table 15 shows the distribution of categorical responses across cog-
nitive levels and set sizes. For formal operational subjects, the 
frequency of "like him a whole lot" responses clearly did increase 
with larger set sizes. For concrete operational children~ the fre-
quency of polarized responses did increase between sets of three 
(33.3%) and six (66.7%) traits, but not between sets of one and three 
traits (45.8% and 33.3%, respectively). Consistent with the mean 
ratings of preoperational children, no set-size effects were found for 
polarized responses. Specifically, across all set sizes~ high per-
centages of responses were "like him a whole lot," suggesting a ceiling 
effect. Examining the distribution of responses across cognitive 
levels within each sequence also reveals no significant differences 
for any of the set sizes. 
Likability judgments (negative set sizes): ANOVA. For negative 
set sizes a three (cognitive level of development) by two (trait 
replication) by two (speaker) by two (sex of subject) by three (nega-
tive set sizes) analysis of variance again was used to analyze 
TABLE 15 
Percent Usage of Likability Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Positive Sequence - Study II 
Likability Category 
"like him a whole lot" 
"like him" 
"like him a little bit" 
"dislike him a little bit" 
"dislike him" 
"dislike him a whole lot" 
ax2(6) = 6.52, ~ <.10 
Percent Responses Across Sequences 
Cognitive Level pa pppb ppppppC 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
70.8% 
45.8% 
25.0% 
20.8% 
41.7% 
54.2% 
4.2% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
8.3% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
"(). 0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
b 2 X (8) = 12.10, ~ >.10 
62.5% 
33.3% 
50.0% 
25.0% 
41.7% 
45.8% 
8.3% 
20.8% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
c 2 X (8) = 4.75, ~ >.10 
75.0% 
66.7% 
75.0% 
16.7% 
16.7% 
16.7% 
4.2% 
12.5% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
4.2% 
0. 01~ 
4.2% 
0.0% 
4.2% 
0.0% 
-....) 
-....) 
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responses. The ANOVA summary table along with the means and standard 
deviations are presented in Tables 16 and 17, respectively. 
In contrast to the ratings based on positive set sizes, for 
negative information a significant main effect was found for cognitive 
level, !(2,48) = 3.64, £ <.05. The mean rating of preoperational 
children was significantly less negative than the mean rating of the 
grouped concrete and formal operational subjects, ~(70) = 2.42, £ <.05. 
No difference in ratings was found between concrete and formal sub-
jects. A significant main effect also was found for the speaker 
condition, !(1,48) = 4.11, £ <.05. That is, one of the speakers again 
unexpectedly elicited more positive ratings. This is the same speaker 
for which more positive responses tvere given in the positive stimulus 
sequences. The only other significant main effect was for set size, 
F(2,96) = 9.69, E <.01. Sets composed of three negative traits were 
rated more negatively than single trait sets (~(71) = 3.49, £ <.001) 
and six trait sets (~(71) = 3.44, £ <.001). 
The cognitive level by speaker interaction also was significant, 
!(2,48) 7.83, £ <.01. This interaction appeared to be due to 
ratings made by preoperational children in one of the speaker condi-
tions. That is, the mean difference between speakers for ratings 
made by preoperational children (3.61 versus 5.28) was greater than 
the mean differences for concrete (5.08 versus 5.00) and formal sub-
jects (5.22 versus 4.97). Revietv of the tapes revealed no plausible 
reason why this effect might have occurred. The o~ly other signifi-
cant effect was for the cognitive level by trait replication by 
speaker by sex of subject interaction, !(2,48) 3.92, £ <.05. 
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TABLE 16 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability Ratings 
Based on Negative Traits - Study II 
Source MS df F 
Cognitive Level (A) 9.43 2 3.64* 
Trait Replication (B) 
.17 1 .06 
Speaker (C) 10.67 1 4.11* 
Sex of Subject (D) .67 1 .26 
Ax B 2.79 2 1.08 
A X c 20.29 2 7.83** 
Ax D 3.93 2 1.52 
B X c 1.85 1 .71 
B x D 1.18 1 .46 
c X D .91 1 • 35 
A X B X c .06 2 .02 
Ax B X D 2.92 2 1.13 
A X C X D 1.59 2 .61 
B X C X D .91 1 • 35 
Ax B X C X D 10.17 2 3. 92* 
Error (between) 2.59 48. 
Negative Set Size (E) 8.76 2 9.68** 
AxE 1. 59 4 1. 76 
B X E 2.76 2 3.05 
C X E .68 2 . 75 
D X E 1.85 2 2.04 
Ax B X E . 66 4 .73 
Ax C X E 1. 24 4 1. 37 
Ax Dx E 2. 30 4 2.54 
B X C X E .42 2 .46 
B X D X E 2.03 2 2.25 
c X D X E 1.00 2 1.11 
Ax B X c X E .28 4 . 30 
Ax B X D X E 1.08 4 1.19 
A X c X D X E 1. 41 4 1.56 
B X c X D X E 1.12 2 1. 23 
Ax B x C X D X E .07 4 .07 
Error (within) .90 96 
*£. <.05 
**£. <.01 
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TABLE 17 
Means and Standard Deviations for Likability Ratings Based on Negative 
Information Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence - Study II 
Cognitive Level Trait Sequence N NNN NNNNNN 
Preoperational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 4.58 4.25 3.92 
(standard deviation) (1. 68) (2. 05) (2.02) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 5.17 3.83 4.92 
(standard deviation) ( .94) (2. 21) (1. 24) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 4.88 4.04 4.42 
(standard deviation) (1. 36) (2.10) (1. 72) 
Concrete Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 5.00 5.08 5.33 
(standard deviation) (1.13) (1. 00) ( .98) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 4.92 4.50 5.42 
(standard deviation) (1. 08) (1. 24) (1. 08) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 4.96 4. 79 5.38 
(standard deviation) (1.08) (1.14) (1. 01) 
Formal Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 5.58 4.75 5.50 
(standard deviation) ( .67) (1.14) ( .52) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 5.08 4.33 5.33 
(standard deviation) (1. 31) ( .78) (1.23) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 5.33 4.54 5.42 
(standard deviation) (1.05) ( .98) ( . 93) 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("like him a whole lot") to 6 
("dislike him a 1v-hole lot"). 
81 
Likability judgments (negative set sizes): planned c~arisons. 
Examination of Figure 4 suggests curvilinear trends across set sizes 
for all three cognitive levels. That is, sets of six negative traits 
and single negative traits were rated as less likable than sets of 
three traits. However, only for the formal operational subjects was 
a quadratic trend found to be statistically significant, F(l,46) 
13.46, ~ <.01. For none of the cognitive levels did linear trends 
add significantly to predictability. Additional analyses were made 
using planned comparisons. Specifically, for preoperational responses 
the difference between sets of three traits and one trait was signi-
ficant (£,1,192) = 9.21, ~ <.01), while no difference was found be-
tween sets of three and six traits (£(1,192) = 1.86, £ >.10). Rat-
ings made by concrete operational children showed the opposite 
pattern. That is, the difference between six and three traits was 
significant (!(1,192) = 4.51, £ <.05), but the difference between 
three traits and one trait was not (£(1,192) = .37, ~ >.10). For 
formal operational subjects, both differences were significant. The 
sets of six negative traits were rated as less likable than sets of 
three traits (£(1,192) = 10.15, ~ <.01), and single trait sets were 
rated as less likable than the three trait sets (!(1,192) = 3.31, 
~ <.01). 
Likability judgments (negative trait sets): response distribu-
tion. Table 18 shows the distribution of categorical responses across 
set sizes and cognitive levels. Examination of only the "dislike a 
whole lot" percentages suggests trends similar to those reflected in 
the mean ratings. That is, for preoperational children small 
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TABLE 18 
Percent Usage of Likability Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Negative Sequence--Study II 
"like him a whole lot" 
"like him" 
"like him a little bit" 
"dislike him a little bit" 
"dislike him" 
"dislike him a whole lot" 
ax2(10) 
bx2(10) = 
12.54, .E. >.10 
21.49, .E. <.05 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
preoperational 
concrete 
formal 
cx2 (10) = 19.29, £<.OS 
________ P_ercent Re~ponses Across Sequences 
Na NNNb NNNNNNc 
4.2% 25.0% 4.2% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
0.0% 4.2% 16.7% 
4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 
4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 
8.3% 4.2% 8.3% 
4.2% 8.3% 8.3% 
4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 
29.2% 16.7% 20.8% 
20.8% 25.0% 12.5% 
4.2% 41.7% 4.2% 
8.3% 8.3% 4.2% 
33.3% 29.2% 12.5% 
29.2% 33.3% 33.3% 
50.0% 41.7% 45.8% 
37.5% 33.3% 66.7% 
58.3% 16.7% 58.3% 
00 
UJ 
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differences were found in the percentages of polarized responses across 
set sizes. For concrete operational children, a large difference was 
found between sets of six traits and three traits (66.7% versus 33.3%), 
but not between three traits and one trait (33.3% versus 37.5%). Con-
sistent w~th the significant quadratic trend found for formal opera-
tional subjects, large differences existed between six and three traits 
(58.3% versus 16.7%) and between three traits and one trait (16.7% 
versus 58.3%). Within trait sequences significant differences in 
responses among cognitive levels were found for both the NNN and NNNNNN 
sequences (See Table 18). 
Behavioral predictions. As in Study I, the Behavioral Prediction 
Test was used in Study II to assess subjects' use of trait information 
in predicting behaviors. The BPT was scored so that low scores would 
reflect more positive predictions than high scores. Correlations 
between the likability and prediction scales then were calculated for 
each subject across the six positive and negative set sizes. For 
preoperational children, rho correlations ranged from .286 to 1.0 with 
a median of .914. For concrete operational subjects the range was 
.600 to 1.0 with a median of .950; while for formal subjects the range 
was -.243 to .986 with a median of .907. The results again indicate 
that for all cognitive levels the scales were highly related. 
Behavioral predictions (positive set sizes): ANOVA. For the 
positive trait information, a three (level of cognitive development) 
by two (trait replication) by two (speaker) by two (sex of subject) 
by three (positive set sizes) analysis of variance with subjects 
repeated across set sizes was used to analyze predictions. The ANOVA 
summary table along with the means and standard deviations for the 
three cognitive levels are presented in Tables 19 and 20, respectively. 
The only significant main effect was for trait replication, 
F(l,48) = 4.22, E <.05. Unlike for the likability ratings, replica-
tion 1 elicited more frequent positive predictions than replication 2 
(respective means, .17 and .52). Since replications did not signifi-
cantly interact with set sizes, this effect could not be attributed 
to any particular set size. However, a predicted interaction was 
found between cognitive level and set size, F(4,96) = 3.54, E <.025. 
Examination of Figure 5 reveals a pattern of responses similar to 
that of the judgments of liking. That is, for preoperational children, 
small differences were found among set sizes. Thus, it is not sur-
prising neither planned comparisons of the differences nor linear 
and quadratic trends were significant. Further, neither the planned 
comparisons nor trends for concrete responses were significant. For 
formal operational subjects, sets of three positive traits elicited 
the fewest positive predictions. That is, comparisons between three 
and six traits (!(1,96) = 7.34, E <.01) and between three and single 
trait sets (!(1,96) = 7.34, E <.01) were both significant. As ex-
pected, trend analyses revealed only the quadratic trend to be signi-
ficant (!(1,46) = 15.61, E <.01). 
Table 21 shows the distribution of the frequencies of negative 
predictions across set sizes and cognitive levels. For the positive 
set sizes, the majority of subjects made consistently positive 
TABLE 19 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions 
Based on Positive Traits--Study II 
Source MS df 
Cognitive Level (A) 1. 39 2 
Trait Replication (B) 6.68 1 
Speaker (G) .02 1 
Sex of Subject (D) 3.63 1 
Ax B 2.12 2 
A X c 2.12 2 
Ax D • 36 2 
B x G 1.50 1 
B x D 1.18 1 
G x D . 67 1 
Ax B x c 1. 76 2 
A X B x D . 70 2 
Ax G x D 4.01 2 
B X G X D .07 1 
A X B X c X D .64 2 
Error (between) 1.58 48 
Positive Set Size (E) • 24 2 
AxE 2.26 4 
B X E .13 2 
G X E .91 2 
D X E 1. 35 2 
Ax B X E .83 4 
A X G X E .78 4 
AxDx v .82 4 u 
B X c X E • 39 2 
Bx D X E .46 2 
C X D X E .06 2 
A X B X C X E .63 4 
Ax B X D x E .50 4 
Ax C X D X E 1.17 4 
B X c X D X E 1.24 2 
Ax BxCxDx E .46 4 
Error (within) .64 96 
*p <.05 
**£ <.025 
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F 
.88 
4.22* 
.01 
2.29 
1.33 
1.33 
.23 
.95 
.75 
.42 
1.11 
.44 
2.54 
.05 
.41 
• 38 
3. 54~~* 
.20 
1.42 
2.12 
1.30 
1.21 
1.28 
.61 
.72 
.09 
.99 
.78 
1.84 
1.94 
.71 
TABLE 20 
Means and Standard Deviations for Predictions Based on Positive 
Information Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence--Study II 
Cognitive Level 
p 
Trait Sequence 
ppp pppppp 
Preoperational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean • 33 .ns .08 
(standard deviation) ( .65) ( .29) ( • 29") 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean .92 .58 .92 
(standard deviation) (1. 93) (1. 50) (1. 93) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean .62 • 33 .50 
(standard deviation) (1.44) (1.09) (1. 41) 
Concrete Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean .00 .17 .50 
(standard deviation) ( .00) ( . 39) (1.45) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean .17 .00 .42 
(standard deviation) ( . 39) ( .00) (1.44) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean .08 .08 .46 
(standard deviation) ( .28) ( .28) (1.41) 
Formal Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean .00 .25 .08 
(standard deviation) ( .00) ( • 62) ( .29) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean .25 1.25 .17 
(standard deviation) ( .62) (1.14) ( .58) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean .12 • 75 .12 
(standard deviation) ( .45) (1.03) ( .45) 
Note. Mean ratings ranged froT'l. 0 (no negative predictions) to 5 
(five negative predictions). 
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TABLE 21 
Prediction Frequencies Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Positive Sequence--Study II 
Negative Predictions Cognitive Level Percent Responses Across Seque~ces 
pa pppb ppppppC 
-
preoperational 75.0% 87.5% 83.3% 
0 concrete 91.7% 91.7% 87.5% 
formal 91.7% 58.3% 91.7% 
preoperational 12.5% 4.2% 8.3% 
1 concrete 8.3% 8.3% 4.2% 
formal 4.2% 16.7% 4.2% 
preoperational 4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 
2 concrete 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
formal 4.2% 16.7% 4.2% 
preoperational 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
3 concrete 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%. 
formal 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 
preoperational 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
4 concrete 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
formal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
preoperational 8.3% 4.2% 8.3% 
5 concrete 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 
formal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
ax2(6) = 6.52, £ >.10 
hx2(8) = 15.20, £ <,10 
cx2 (6) = 4.60, ~ >.10 
CXl 
\.0 
predictions. Although consistent with the mean ratings, formal oper-
ational subjects were less likely than others to make consistently 
positive predictions for the PPP sequences (x2 (8) = 15.20, ~ <.06). 
Behavioral predictions (negative set sizes): ANOVA. A three 
(cognitive level of development) by two (trait replication) by two 
(speaker) by t\vO (sex of subject) by three (negative set sizes) 
analysis of variance also was used to analyze predictions based on 
negative information. The ANOVA summary table along with the means 
and standard deviations for the three cognitive levels are presented 
in Tables 22 and 23. 
90 
As seen in Table 22, significant main effects were found for 
cognitive level (f(2,48) = 6.02, ~ <.01) and set size (!(2,96) = 10.76, 
£ <.01). Specifically, preoperational children made significantly 
fewer negative predictions than grouped concrete and formal subjects 
(!_(70) = 3.55, £ <.001), while no difference was found between concrete 
and formal predictions (!_(46) = .68, ~ <.10). For the significant 
set size ::1ain effect, three trait sets elicited fewer negative pre-
dictions than either six trait sets (!_(71) = 3.68, p <.01) or single 
trait sets (!_(71) = 3.10, ~ <.01). As hypothesized, a significant 
interaction also was found between cognitive level and set size 
(F(4,96) = 4.87, ~ <.01), although the pattern of responses was un-
predicted. Figure 6 illustrates the mean ratings for each cognitive 
level across set sizes. Not surprisingly, neither the linear nor 
quadratic trends were significant for concrete or formal subjects, 
although for preoperational children a quadratic trend was found 
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TABLE 22 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions 
Based on Negative Traits--Study II 
Source MS df F 
Cognitive Level (A) 11.43 2 6.02* 
Trait Replication (B) 1.50 1 • 79 
Speaker (C) 4. 74 1 2.50 
Sex of Subject (D) .07 1 .04 
A x B 2. 35 2 1.24 
A X c 4.59 2 2.42 
Ax D .23 2 .12 
B x C .67 1 • 35 
B x D . 30 1 .16 
C X D .02 1 .01 
A X B X c .87 2 • 46 
A X B X D 1. 86 2 .98 
Ax C x D 2.42 2 1.28 
B X c X D 1.50 1 • 79 
A X B X c X D .54 2 .28 
Error (between) 1.90 48 
Negative Set Size (E) 8.76 2 10.76* 
A X E 3.96 4 4.87* 
B X E • 93 2 1.14 
C X E 1.12 2 1.37 
D X E .62 2 .76 
Ax B x E • 38 4 .47 
Ax C X E 1.69 4 2.08 
A X D X E .66 4 • 82 
B X c X E .04 2 .05 
B X D X E 2.17 2 2.66 
C X D X E • 06 2 .07 
A X B x C X E .64 4 • 79 
Ax B X D X E 1. 88 4 2.32 
A X C X D x E .65 4 .80 
B X C X D x E . 37 2 .46 
Ax B X c X D X E .02 4 .02 
Error (within) . 81 96 
*E. <.01 
TABLE 23 
Heans and Standard Deviations for Predictions Based on Negative 
Information Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence--Study II 
Cognitive Level Trait Sequence 
N NNN NNNNNN 
Preoperational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 4.42 3.17 3.92 
(standard deviation) (1. 44) (2. 25) (1.93) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 5.00 3.25 5.00 
(standard deviation) ( .00) (2. 26) ( .00) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 4. 71 3.21 4.46 
(standard deviation) (1. 04) (2. 21) (1. 44) 
Concrete Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 5.00 4.67 4.92 
(standard deviation) ( .00) ( • 89) ( .29) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 4.83 4.67 5.00 
(standard deviation) ( . 39) (1.15) ( .00) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 4.92 4.67 4.96 
(standard deviation) ( .28) (1. 01) ( • 20) 
Formal Operational 
Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 4.75 4. 75 4.92 
(standard deviation) ( .62) ( .45) ( .29) 
Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 4.67 4.58 5.00 
(standard deviation) (1.15) ( .67) ( .00) 
Both Replications (n=24) 
mean 4. 71 4.67 4.96 
(standard deviation) ( .91) ( .56) ( .20) 
Note. Hean ratings ranged from 0 (no negative predictions) to 5 
(five negative predictions). 
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(_~(1,46) = 18.23, .E_ <.001). For preoperational subjects, planned 
compaYisons further revealed that behavioral predictions based on 
three trait sets were less negative than both the six trait sets 
(I(l,96) = 23.02, .E_ <.001) and the single trait sets (F(l,96) = 33.14, 
E. <.001). 
The distribution of the frequencies of negative predictions 
is shown in Table 24. For all cognitive levels, high percentages of 
respondents made consistently negative predictions. The only devia-
tion from this pattern was preoperational children's responses to the 
NNN sequences for which 25.0% were consistently positive (x2 (10) = 
23.24, E. <.01). 
Likability judgments and behavioral predictions: ordinal posi-
tions. Further analyses were made to determine whether the order in 
which the sequences (both positive and negative) were presented 
affected responses. A three (cognitive level of development) by six 
(latin-square position) analysis-of variance was made for both the 
ratings of liking and the behavioral predictions (Tables 25 and 26, 
respectively) • 
For the likability ratings, a significant main effect was found 
for cognitive level (!(2,54) = 4.84, .E_ <.05). Preoperational children 
made more likable ratings than both concrete subjects (~946) = 2.15, 
.E_ <.05), and formal subjects (~(46) = 2.40, E. <.05). However, no 
significant effects were found for latin-square position or the inter-
action between position and cognitive level. For the behavioral 
predictions, no significant effects \vere found for cognitive level, 
TABLE 24 
Prediction Frequencies Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Negative Sequence--Study II 
Percent Responses Across Seguences 
Negative Predictions CognHive Level Na NNNb NNNNNNc 
preoperational 4.2% 25.0% 8.3% 
0 concrete 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
formal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
preoperational 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 
1 concrete 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 
formal 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
preoperational 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2 concrete 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 
formal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
preoperational 0.0% 4.2% 4.2% 
3 concrete 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
formal 4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 
preoperational 8.3% 12.5% 4.2% 
4 concrete 8.3% 4.2% 4.2% 
formal 4.2% 25.0% 4.2% 
preoperational 87.5% 50.0% 83.3% 
5 concrete 91.7% 87.5% 95.8% 
formal 87.5% 70.8% 95.8% 
ax2(8) = 6.43, ~ >.10 cx2(6) = 6.27, ~ >.10 
bx 2 ClO) = 23.24, ~ <.Ol 
'-" V1 
TABLE 25 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability 
Ratings Based on Sequence Position--Study II 
Source 
Cognitive Level (A) 
Latin-Square Position (B) 
A X B 
Error 
*E. <.05 
HS 
1.53 
.46 
.56 
.32 
df 
2 
5 
10 
54 
F 
4.84* 
1.44 
1.77 
96 
TABLE 26 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions 
Based on Sequence Position--Study II 
Source 
Cognitive Level (A) 
Latin-Square Position (B) 
A X B 
Error 
MS 
.45 
.46 
.23 
.24 
df 
2 
5 
10 
54 
F 
1.89 
1.94 
.96 
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latin-square position, or their interaction. 
Finally, a ~-test was made to determine whether the order in 
which the likability and prediction scales were presented affected 
responses. No significant differences were found in ratings of 
liking (~(70) = .50, ~ >.10) or behavioral predictions (~(70) 
~ >.10. 
Conclusions 
1. 24, 
In conclusion, some evidence of set-size effects was found for 
concrete and formal operational judgments, but not for ratings made 
by preoperational children. For likability judgments based on posi-
tive set sizes, formal responses tended to become more positive as 
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the number of traits in a set increased. Further, the percentages of 
positively polarized responses increased across the larger set sizes. 
For concrete operational subjects, the percentages of polarized judg-
ments increased between three and six trait sets, although the mean 
differences \·Jere not significant. As predicted for preoperational 
children, ratings and percentages of polarized responses varied little 
across set sizes. 
For judgments of liking based on negative information, set-size 
effects w·ere only found between three and six trait sets. That is, 
for concrete and formal operational subjects, six trait sets were 
judged as less likable than three trait sets as reflected by both the 
mean ratings and the increased percentage of polarized responses. 
Preoperational judgments varied little between the three and six trait 
sets. Differences also w·ere found bet\veen single and three trait sets~ 
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although not in the predicted direction. That is, both preoperation-
al and formal operational subjects rated the single trait negative 
sets as less likable than the three trait sets. However, only for the 
formal operational subjects did the percentages of polarized re-
sponses reflect this trend. For concrete operational subjects, no 
significant differences in mean ratings or polarized responses were 
found between the single and three trait sets. 
The finding that set-size effects were not always inclusive of 
single trait sets is surprising since previous research has found the 
set-size effect to be a fairly robust phenomena (c.f., Sloan and Os-
trom, 1974). In part, this failure may be due to methodological lim-
itations of the present study and not refute other research. Speci-
fically, the scale values of the single trait negative sets were 
somewhat higher than the average scale values of the larger set 
sizes. Since sets were constructed by a random selection of traits 
without regard to scale values, this procedure may have confounded 
the results. Typically, small variations in scale values can be 
countered by increasing the number of sets judged, increasing the 
number of subjects, or by using a broader range of set sizes. Un-
fortunately, in the present study the limited attention span of 
younger children and the number of children available did not allow 
for these possibilities. 
Methodological limitations also may explain '"hy few set-size 
effects were found for behavioral predictions. That is, for both 
positive and negative set sizes, high percentages of subjects at each 
cognitive level made either consistently positive or negative 
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predictions. These findings may be attributed to the format of the 
Behavioral Prediction Test. Specifically, subjects were instructed 
to make a series of either positive or negative behavior predictions. 
Such a procedure did not allow for "degrees" of predictions, but 
forced the subjects to make absolute choices. Differences in ratings 
than can be arrived at only if variations in predictions are found 
across the series of dichotomous choices. Since predictions were 
based on homogeneous sets, it is not surprising that high percentages 
of responses were absolutely positive or negative. 
Regardless of these limitations, the results do indicate vari-
ations among cognitive levels in valuation processes. While lika-
bility ratings of preoperational children were generally constant 
across set sizes, concrete and formal subjects tended to polarize 
the six trait sets. Since the average scale values of the three 
and six trait sets were approximately equal, the non-significant 
differences between these sets for preoperational judgments \vould 
indicate that the initial impression (I ) in the six trait sets 
0 
received less weight than in the three trait sets. In contrast, the 
polarization of the six trait sets by older concrete and formal sub-
jects \·lOuld suggest that the weights of the initial impressions were 
constant across the three and six trait sets. These differences in 
valuation processes may be due to variations among subjects in 
cognitive abilities. Specifically, if preoperational children's 
egocentric or unidimensional perspectives lead them to perceive 
others as absolutely good or.bad, then variations in the number of 
traits should have little effect once their impressions have been 
formed. In fact, relatively high percentages of polarized responses 
were found across the trait sequences suggesting that absolute 
impressions will be formed based on minimal information. Once chil-
dren have entered the concrete operational phase, they may realize 
that people, as well as objects, have constant or invariant char-
acteristics. Subjects then may learn to search for these consisten-
cies before making their judgments. Larger set sizes may be more 
reflective of this "consistency" than smaller set sizes and, accord-
ingly, elicit more polarized responses. 
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STUDY III 
Method 
TI1e purpose of Study III was to determine whether "order 
effects" generalized to subjects at different levels of cognitive 
development. Specifically, it was predicted that "primacy effects" 
would be found for concrete and formal operational subjects, while 
a "recency effect" W'Ould be found for preoperational children. 
Differences in these trends for cognitive levels again would suggest 
variations in the weighting or valuation processes of subjects. For 
example, if the trait set NNPP was rated as more positive than the 
PPNN set, this would indicate that the most recent information was 
receiving greater weight (i.e., recency effect). In contrast, if 
the NNPP set \vas rated more negatively than the PPNN set, this would 
suggest that earlier appearing information was receiving greater 
weight (i.e., primacy effect). 
Design. The same subjects tested in Study I also participated 
in Study III. The order of presentations of studies was alternated 
across subjects. In total, seventy-t~vo subjects (both males and 
females) individually heard and responded to ten trait sets com-
prising both studies. 
In Study III two evaluative inconsistent sets of four traits 
were introduced. For each of the sets, two of the traits were eval-
uatively positive followed by two negative traits and vice versa. 
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That is, each subject heard and responded to the evaluative orders 
PPNN and NNPP. Two types of replication sets also were used. That 
is, replication sets were created by using different trait adjectives 
(trait replication), and also by reversing the order of traits within 
existing sets (reversal replication). As example of reversal repli-
cations, the set "smart, glad, mean, angry,"might have had the com-
plementary set "angry, mean, glad, smart." The experimental design 
then was a two (evaluative order) by two (trait replication) by two 
(reversal replication) by two (sex of subject) by three (cognitive 
level of development) factorial. 
Stimulus materials. The same traits used in Studies I and II 
also were used in Study III. Trait replication sets in both eval-
uative orders consisted of different adjectives (See Appendix F). The 
same instructions, mode of stimulus presentation, and dependent var-
iables used in Studies I and II also were used in Study III. 
Results 
Subjects. The seventy-two children and adults tested in Study 
I also participated in Study III. The mean ages and standard devia-
tions broken-dow~ by cognitive level and sex were presented in Table 
1. 
Likability judgments: ANOVA. A three (cognitive level of 
development) by two (trait replication) by two (reversal replication) 
by two (sex of subject) by two (evaluative order) analysis of vari-
ance with subjects repeated across evaluative order was used to 
analyze the judgments of liking. The ANOVA summary table along with 
the means and standard deviations of the ratings for the three cog-
nitive levels are presented in Tables 27 and 28, respectively. 
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No significant main effects were found for any of the factors, 
although some interactions were significant. For example, an inter-
action was found between trait replication and evaluative order 
(I(l,48) = 6.64, £ <.05). Specifically, a primacy effect was found 
for replication 1 traits and a recency effect for replication 2 se-
quences. In replication 1 the traits "wonderful/right" and/or "good/ 
funny" appearing first created the primacy effect, while in replica-
tion 2 the traits "mean/mad" and/or "silly/terrible" appearing last 
created the recency effect. This divergence in trends then was due 
to differences in ratings in the PPXN order and not the NNPP order. 
Since the mean normative ratings of the replication sets were equal 
(rep 1: 3.64 and rep 2: 3.64), it is difficult to explain why this 
interaction occurred. Perhaps the denotative implications of the 
traits "wonderful'' or "good" in replication 1, and "mean" or· "ter-
rible11 in replication 2 led to the polarization of judgments. Since 
this interaction did not differentially affect cognitive levels, it 
creates no real problems with the interpretation of other results. 
A strong interaction also was found between reversal replica-
tion and evaluative order (I(l,48) = 50.00, £ <.001). That is, in 
both evaluative orders (i.e., PPNN and NNPP), the sets "wonderful, 
right, angry, bad" and "brave, smart, mean, mad" were judged as less 
likable than the sets "good, funny, strange, unhappy" and "kind, glaq, 
silly, terrible." This effect cannot be due to differences in evalu-
ative meaning since the mean normative rating of the first two sets 
105 
TABLE 27 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Likability Ratings--Study III 
Source .HS df F 
Cognitive Level (A) 1.86 2 .68 
Trait Replication (B) 5.84 1 2.14 
Reversal Replication (C) 3.67 1 1. 35 
Sex of Subject (D) .01 1 .00 
A X B .19 2 .07 
A X c 4.86 2 1. 78 
A X D .19 2 .07 
B X C 3.06 1 1.12 
B x D 2.51 1 .92 
C X D .17 1 .06 
Ax B X c .08 2 .03 
A X B X D 2.03 2 .74 
Ax C X D 1. 86 2 .68 
B x c X D 1.56 1 .57 
A X B x C X D .58 2 .21 
Error (between) 2.73 48 
Evaluative Order (E) . 01 1 .00 
AxE 2.03 2 1.28 
B X E 10.56 1 6.64* 
C X E 79.51 1 50.00H~ 
D X E .01 1 .00 
Ax B X E 3.08 2 1.94 
Ax C X E 3.03 2 1.90 
Ax D X E .69 2 .44 
B X C X E 5.84 1 3.67 
B X D X E 4. 34 1 2.73 
c X D X E 7.56 1 4.76* 
A X B X C X E .36 2 .23 
A X B X D X E .19 2 .12 
Ax c X D X E 2.25 2 1.42 
B X C X D X E .56 1 • 35 
A X B X C X D X E .25 2 .16 
Error (within) 1. 59 48 
*E. <.05 
**E. <.001 
TABLE 28 
Means and Standard Deviations for Likability Ratings 
Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence--Study III 
Cognitive Level 
Preoperational 
Trait P~plication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Trait Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Both Trait Replications (n=24) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Concrete Operational 
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Trait Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Both Trait Replications (n=24) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Formal Operational 
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Trait Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Both Trait Replications (n=24) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Trait Sequence 
PPNN NNPP 
2.75 3.17 
(1.42) (2.12) 
4.17 2.83 
(1. 90) (1. 75) 
3.46 3.00 
(1. 79) (1. 91) 
2.92 4.00 
(1.56) (1. 54) 
4.00 3.50 
(2.04) (1. 98) 
3.46 3. 75 
(1. 86) (1. 75) 
3.25 3.42 
( .96) (1. 56) 
3.58 3.83 
(1. 24) ( . 83) 
3.42 3.62 
(1.10) (1. 24) 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("like him a whole lot") to 6 
("dislike him a whole lot"). 
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were approximately equal to the rating of the second two sets (i.e., 
3.88 and 3.40, respectively). Since these sets were used in both 
evaluative orders, this difference obscures any primacy-recency effects. 
That is, in one reversal replication this difference led to a primacy 
effect, while in the other replication it led to a recency effect. 
These opposite trends then conceal any differences among cognitive 
levels in primacy-recency effects. 
Finally, a significant interaction was found for sex of subject 
by reversal replication by evaluative order (f(l,48) = 4.76, ~ <.05). 
That is, the above reversal replication by evaluative order differ-
ences were stronger for males than females. No other interactions 
were significant. 
Unlike the previous studies, Study III did not include a "speaker" 
condition in the ANOVA. To do so would have necessitated doubling the 
sample size to insure reliability of the results, and, further, would 
have made interpretations of higher order interactions unwieldy. 
Instead, subjects were selected for each speaker condition on the 
basis of equal occurrences within the trait replication,. reversal 
replication, and sex conditions (but not necessarily on the basis of 
equal occurrences within the interactions of these conditions). A 
~-test was made between speaker conditions. Results were not signifi-
cant (~(70) = 1.13, ~ >.10), indicating no difference in judgments as 
a function of the speaker presenting the traits. 
Likability judgments: planned comparisons. Planned comparisons 
also were made. Examination of Figure 7 suggests differences among 
cognitive levels in trends across evaluative orders. That is, across 
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the PPNN and ~~p sequences there appears to be a recency effect for 
preoperational children's ratings and primacy effects for concrete and 
formal operational judgments. Hm..rever, for none of the cognitive 
levels were these differences significant (preoperational: f(l,48) 
1.58, £ >.10; concrete: f(l,48) = .64, £ >.10; formal: F(l,48) = .13, 
£ >.10). This failure to find differences is not surprising since the 
reversal replication by evaluative order interaction may have obscured 
any differences. 
Likability judgments: response distribution. Table 29 shows 
the distribution of responses across the various categories. Although 
for neither of the sequences was the chi square significant, there were 
somewhat different patterns of responses across the three cognitive 
levels. That is, while preoperational and concrete operational chil-
dren tended to spread their ratings across the six response categories, 
formal operational subjects tended to group their responses in the 
middle categories. This trend is most clearly seen when categories 
are combined by extremity of response, ignoring evaluative meaning. 
Specifically, "like a whole lot" can be combined with "dislike a whole 
lot"; "like" with "dislike"; and "like just a little bit" with "dis-
like just a little bit." For the PPNN sequences, 62.5% of the formal 
operational subjects used the least extreme two categories (i.e., "like/ 
dislike just a little bit"), while only 33.3% of the preoperational 
and 29.1% of the concrete children did so. Although this distribution 
of responses is somewhat different among cognitive levels, no differ-
ences in mean ratings were found since the corresponding positive and 
negative response categories were used with approximately equal 
TABLE 29 
Percent Usage of Likability Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Evaluative Order--Study III 
Likability Category Cognitive Level Percent 'Responses Across Sequences PPNNa NNPPb 
preoperational 16.7% 29.2% 
"like him a whole lot" concrete 16.7% 16.7% 
formal 4.2% 0.0% 
preoperational 16.7% 25.0% 
"like him" concrete 20.8% 12.5% 
formal 16.7% 20.8% 
preoperational 25.0% 8.3% 
"like him a little bit" concrete 20.8% 8.3% 
formal 29.2% 29.2% 
preoperatioanl 8.3% 8.3% 
"dislike him a little bit" concrete 8.3% 20.8% 
formal 33.3% 25.0% 
preoperational 12.5% 12.5% 
"dislike him" concrete 8.3% 25.0% 
formal 16.7% 16.7% 
preoperational 20.8% 16.7% 
"dislike him a whole lot" concrete 25.0% 16.7% 
formal 0.0% 8.3% 
ax2(10) ~ 14.79, £ >.10 hx2ClO) ~ 16.15, E <.10 I-' I-' 
0 
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frequencies by each of the cognitive levels. However, the differ-
ences in response distribution are important for they may suggest 
variations in the processes by which impressions were formed. That 
is, while formal operational subjects appeared to average the trait 
information before making their judgments, younger subjects tended to 
be more absolute in their responses. 
For the NNPP trait sequences, similar non-significant differ-
ences in response distributions were found among cognitive levels. 
However, preoperational and concrete children again tended to distri-
bute their ratings across all response categories, while formal oper-
ational subjects appeared to group their responses in the center of 
the scale. As seen in Table 29, preoperational children also were 
more likely to make judgments of "like a whole lot" and "like" (54.2%) 
than concrete and formal subjects (29.2% and 20.8%, respectively). 
This latter difference resulted in the apparent trend toward recency 
found for preoperational children. In contrast, older concrete and 
formal operational subjects were more likely than preoperational chil-
dren to make ratings of "dislike just a little bit" or "dislike" 
(preoperational: 20.8%; concrete: 45.8%; formal: 41.7%), resulting 
in apparent trends toward primacy. 
Likability judgments: ordinal positions. The order in which the 
PPNN and NNPP trait sequences were presented was alternated across 
subjects. That is, half of the subjects heard the PPNN sequences 
first and the other half the NNPP sets first. A t-test for the 
difference in ratings of liking was not significant, ~(70) = .27, 
.E. >.10. 
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The order in which Studies I and III were presented also was 
alternated across subjects. For Study III no significant difference 
in ratings of liking was found, ~(70) = 1.24, ~ >.10. 
Behavioral predictions. As in the previous studies, the BPT was 
scored so that low scores would reflect more positive predictions 
than high scores. For the PPNN sequences, the Pearson correlations 
between the likability and prediction scales were significant for 
preoperational (~(22) = .706, £ <.001) and concrete children (~(22) = 
.851, ~ <.001), but only marginally significant for formal operational 
subjects (~(22) = .297, ~ <.10). A Fisher's r to z transformation 
found the differences in correlations between preoperational and for-
mal responses (~ = 1.88, ~ <.05) and between concrete and formal 
responses (~ = 3.08, £ <.01) to be both significant. The difference 
in correlations between preoperational and concrete responses was not 
significant (~ = 1.20, ~ >.10). For the NNPP sequences, the scales 
were correlated significantly for all cognitive levels (preoperation-
al: ~(22) = .696, ~ <.001; concrete: ~(22) = .587, ~ <.001; formal: 
r(22) = .442, ~ <.05). None of the differences in correlations 
between cognitive levels was significant. 
Behavioral predictions: ANOVA. A three (cognitive level of 
development) by two (trait replication) by two (reversal replication) 
by two (sex of subject) by two (evaluative order) analysis of variance 
with subjects repeated across evaluative order was used to analyze 
the behavioral predictions. The ANOVA summary table along with the 
means and standard deviations of the predictions are presented in 
Tables 30 and 31, respectively. 
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TABLE 30 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Predictions--Study III 
Source NS df F 
Cognitive Level (A) 7.52 2 2.29 
Trait Replication (B) 11.11 1 3.39 
Reversal Replication (C) .44 1 .14 
Sex of Subject (D) 4.69 1 1.43 
Ax B • 30 2 .09 
A X c 1.26 2 .38 
AxD 3.84 2 1.17 
B X c .25 1 .08 
B x D .44 1 .14 
C X D .00 1 .00 
Ax B X c 2.64 2 .81 
Ax B x D 10.59 2 3.23 
Ax c X D 1. 27 2 . 39 
B X C X D .03 1 .01 
Ax B X c X D 1. 80 2 .55 
Error (between) 3.28 48 
Evaluative Order (E) .69 1 .37 
AxE 3.01 2 1.59 
B x E 1.00 1 .53 
C X E 169.00 1 89. 49*•'~* 
D x E 6.25 1 3.31 
A X B X E 1.90 2 1.00 
Ax C X E 4.52 2 2.39 
Ax D X E 1.02 2 • 54 
B X c X E 6.25 1 3.31 
B X D X E 2.78 1 1.47 
c X D X E 18.78 1 9. 94i'* 
Ax BxCx E .52 2 .28 
Ax B X D X E 6.88 2 3. 64i~ 
Ax c X D X E 1.67 2 • 89 
B X c X D X E .69 1 .37 
Ax BxCxDx E 7.92 2 4.20* 
Error (within) 1.89 48 
*E. <.05 
**E. <.01 
***p <.001 
TABLE 31 
Means and Standard Deviations for Predictions Broken-down 
by Cognitive Level and Sequence--Study III 
Cognitive Level 
Preoperational 
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Trait Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Both Trait Replications (n=24) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Concrete Operational 
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Trait Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Both Trait Replications (n=24) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Formal Operational 
Trait Replication 1 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Trait Replication 2 (n=l2) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Both Trait Replications (n=24) 
mean 
standard deviation 
Trait Sequence 
PPNN NNPP 
2.00 2.00 
(2.09) (2 .13) 
3.00 1. 75 
(2.17) (2 .14) 
2.50 1.88 
(2 .15) (2.09) 
2.25 2.58 
(2.18) (2. 31) 
2.83 3.25 
(2.04) (2.26) 
2.54 2.92 
(2.08) (2.26) 
2.75 2.50 
(2.05) (1. 78) 
3.33 3.25 
(1. 56) (1. 48) 
3.04 2.88 
(1. 80) (1. 65) 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 0 (no negative predictions) to 5 
(five negative predictions). 
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As with the judgments of liking, no significant main effects 
were found for behavioral predictions. In contrast to the likability 
judgments, no effects were found for the trait replication by evalu-
ative order interaction. However, the interaction between reversal 
replication and evaluative order again was significant, !(1,48) = 
89.49, .E._ <.001. In both evaluative orders, the sets "wonderful, 
right, angry, bad" and "brave, smart, mean, madtt were judged as less 
likable than the sets "good, funny, strange, unhappy" and "kind, 
glad, silly, terrible." In one reversal replication these differences 
led to a primacy effect, while in the other replication they led to 
a recency effect. These opposite trends again obscured differences 
among cognitive levels in primacy-recency effects. 
A significant interaction also was found for sex of subject by 
reversal replication by evaluative order, !(1,48) = 9.94, .E._ <.01. As 
found for the likability ratings, the reversal replication by eval-
uative order differences appeared to be stronger for males than 
females. Finally, marginal effects were found for the cognitive 
level by trait replication by sex by evaluative order interaction 
(!{2,48) = 3.64, .E._ <.05) and for the cognitive level by trait repli-
cation by reversal replication by sex of evaluative order interaction 
(!(2,48) = 4.20, E. <.05). However, the large number of factors 
makes these interactions uninterpretable. 
A !_-test was separately made for the speaker condition. Af; 
expected, differences in predictions elicited by the two speakers 
were not significant, !_(70) = .27, E. >.10. 
Behavioral predictions: planned comparisons. Planned 
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comparisons again were made. Examination of Figure 8 suggests a 
recency effect for preoperational children and a primacy effect for 
concrete operational subjects. These were the same apparent trends 
found for the likability judgments, although no primacy effect 
appeared for the formal operational subjects. However, for none of 
the cognitive levels were the differences between PP~~ and NNPP 
sequences significant (preoperational: F(l,48) 2.48, ~ >.10; con-
crete: £(1,48) = .89, z >.10; formal: £(1,48) = .18, ~ >.10). 
Behavioral predictions: response distribution. Table 32 
shows the distribution of frequencies of negative predictions across 
trait sequences. Although the chi squares were not statistically 
significant, examination reveals somewhat different patterns of pre-
dictions across the three cognitive ~evels. For the PPNN sequences 
preoper2tional and concrete children were somewhat more likely than 
formal operational subjects to make either consistently positive or 
negative predictions. That is, 62.5% of both the preoperational and 
concrete children made consistent predictions as compared to only 
41.7% of the formal operational subjects. For the NNPP sequences, 
preoperational and concrete subjects again were more likely than 
formal subjects to make consistent predictions. Specifically, 66.7% 
of the preoperational and 79.2% of the concrete operational children 
made consistently positive or negative predictions as compared to 
37.5% of the formal operational subjects. Further, preoperational 
children were more likely to make consistently positive predictions 
or only one negative prediction (54.2%) than concrete (33.4%) and 
formal (16.6%) subjects. It was this tendency that resulted in an 
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TABLE 32 
Prediction Frequencies Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Evaluative Order--Study III 
Negative Predictions Cognitive Level Percent Respon~es Across Sequences PPNNa NNPPb 
preoperational 25.0% 41.7% 
0 concrete 29.2% 29.2% 
formal 16.7% 8.3% 
preoperational 20.8% 12.5% 
1 concrete 4.2% 4.2% 
formal 4.2% 8.3% 
preoperational 8.3% 16.7% 
2 concrete 20.8% 12.5% 
formal 16.7% 33.3% 
preoperational 8.3% 0.0% 
3 concrete 8.3% 4.2% 
formal 8.3% 16.7% 
preoperational 0.0% 4.2% 
4 concrete 4.2% 0.0% 
formal 29.2% 4.2% 
preoperational 37.5% 25.0% 
5 concrete 33.3% 50.0% 
formal 25.0% 29.2% 
ax2(10) = 18.03, £ >.05 
bx2(10) = 17.64, E >.05 f-' f-' 
co 
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apparent trend toward recency in predictions for preoperational 
children. In contrast, 50.0% of the concrete operational children 
made consistently negative responses to the NNPP sequences as compared 
to 25.0% of the preoperational children and 33.4% of the formal 
subjects. It was. this tendency that resulted in an apparent trend 
toward primacy for concrete operational children. 
Behavioral predictions: ordinal positions. The orders in which 
both trait sequences (i.e., PPNN and NNPP) and Studies (I and III) 
were presented were alternated across subjects. No differences in 
predictions were found as a function of the sequence order (.!:_(70) = 
0.0, E_= 1.0). However, a difference was found in predictions as a 
function of whether Study I or III Has presented first. Specifically, 
subjects who heard Study I sequences first unexplainably gave fewer 
negative predictions in Study III than subjects who were first 
presented with Study III sequences (.!:_(70) = 3.01, E_ <.01). 
Conclusions 
Although differences between PPNN and NNPP sequences were not 
significant for either the likability ratings or behavioral predic-
tions, C06~itive levels diverged in the direction of their responses. 
Specifically, for preoperational children there appeared to be a trend 
toward recency in judgments, while for concrete subjects there 
appeared to be a trend toward primacy. For formal operational sub-
jects a trend tmvard primacy only \vas found for the judgments of 
liking, while no difference was found for predictions. These differ-
ences. appeared largely due to variations in ratings of the NNPP 
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sequences and not of the PPNN sets. 
Differences in trends may indicate variations in valuation 
processes among cognitive levels. That is, if different orderings of 
the same adjectives elicit different responses, then the weight 
parameter cannot be constant. Specifically, preoperational children 
may be assigning more weight to the later appearing adjectives in the 
NNPP sequences, while concrete and formal operational subjects must 
be giving greater weight to the earlier appearing adjectives. These 
differences may be due to variations in cognitive abilities. Pre-
operational children, not having mastered the principle of invariance, 
may not have learned to search for consistencies in the characteris-
tics or traits of others. Not expecting characteristics to remain 
constant, an early "crystalization" of their impressions does not 
ensue. Rather, the impressions preoperational children form change 
with the shifting information. Since the immediacy of the latter 
appearing traits may make them more salient, judgments tend to be 
based on the most recent information. 
In contrast, older concrete and formal subjects who have 
mastered the principle of invariance have learned to expect consis-
tencies in the behaviors and characteristics of others. Thus, once 
impressions are formed, older subjects may not fully attend to addi-
tional information even when it is inconsistent. This early crystal-
ization of their impressions then results in more weight being assigned 
to the earlier appearing adjectives. That inconsistent information 
still tends to be averaged into the final impression is indicated 
by formal operational subjects making fewer polarized judgments than 
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the younger subjects. 
Primacy and recency effects may have been stronger if sets 
containing more traits had been presented. That is, sets of only 
four traits may not have been sufficiently large enough for the early 
c.rystalization process of older subjects to have become fully opera-
tive. Hmvever, sets of six or eight inconsistent traits may have 
made any interpretation of recency effects for preoperational children 
difficult. That is, an alternative explanation may have been the 
inability to recall earlier appearing information. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Although some of the hyptheses in the present studies were not 
supported, results do indicate certain trends in the development of 
impression formation processes. However, before these trends are 
reviewed, certain assumptions and limitations of this research will 
be discussed. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
One of the primary assumptions of these studies was that the 
verbal responses would be accurate reflections of the actual cogni-
tive processes of the subjects. That is, the ability to verbally 
communicate one's thoughts may influence one's response capability 
(Shantz, 1975). Of course, this may be a potential confound in much 
of psychological research, but it becomes a particularly salient 
consideration when dealing with children. The present research 
attempted to limit the dependence on the children's abilities to 
verbally co:m.."11unicate their thoughts by using pictoral and verbal 
response measures. Children were required to respond both by repeat-
ing the verbal expressions which they felt expressed their degree 
of liking and by pointing to the pictures most reflective of those 
impressions. Further, the likability and prediction scales were 
designed so that children would be "forced" to choose only among a 
limited number of response alternatives at one time. Additionally, 
it was felt that using two different types of response scales would 
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serve as a check on convergent validity of the response measures. 
That is, it was felt that similar patterns of results derived from 
two types of scales would provide greater confidence in the validity 
of the responses than if only one had been used. Certainly these 
methodological approaches did not guarantee that responses \vere a 
direct reflection of cognitive processes, but they did limit the con-
found with the children's abilities to verbally communicate their 
thoughts. 
Perhaps a more critical assumption was that the "meaning" of 
the response categories comprising the likability scale would be the 
same across all levels of cognitive development. For example, it 
was assumed that "like him a whole lot" would carry the same evalua-
tive connotation for all subjects. The validity of this assumption 
is an important consideration, since children's abilities to use 
interval scales have not been fully documented. Thus, it is possible 
that children do not differentiate between such categories as "like 
him" and "like him a whole lotn in the same way as adults. In the 
present study it was assumed that the varying degrees of "liking" 
and "disliking" -.;v-ere made salient through the dimension of size, in 
addition to requiring all subjects to verbally label the pictures 
most reflective of their judgments. Although this approach did not 
guarantee that the meaning was the same for all subjects, the pic-
toral and verbal stimuli should have highlighted the interval nature 
of the response categories. 
One limitation of the present studies had to do with the 
dependent measures. To insure simplicity and understanding of the 
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likability scale, subjects w·ere first asked to make a decision of 
whether they would "like11 or "dislike" the target person. Subjects 
were subsequently asked to choose among three levels of liking or 
disliking. This approach limited the number of response alternatives 
to six. This limited variation within the scale may not have been 
sensitive to the degrees of cognitive differentiation actually being 
made by the subjects. Thus, the scale may be assessing only the 
"crudest" of differences among trait stimuli. In addition, the lack 
of a neutral or "I don't know" category may have eliminated a legi-
timate response. That is, subjects may not have actually formed 
any impressions. Of course, "forcing" the subjects to form impres-
sions was the purpose of the research, but it may not accurately 
reflect cognitive operations occurring under more natural circum-
stances. 
The construct validity of the likability scale also might be 
questioned. That is, pictoral as well as verbal labels were used to 
differentiate among response categories. It is possible that the 
pictures may have portrayed affective components not necessarily 
reflective of liking or disliking. For example, the "like him" 
pictures also might be labeled as "happy" and thereby confuse the 
children in making their ratings. To minimize this confound, sub-
jects were required to apply the verbal label to those pictures that 
portrayed their impressions. This guaranteed that all subjects 
had, at least, verbalized the concepts. In addition, degrees of 
liking and disliking were portrayed by the same "like" and "dislike" 
caricatures--variations in degrees only being reflected in the 
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gradient of size. The same affective stimuli then were constant 
across the degrees of "liking" and "disliking," minimizing the pos-
sibility that a given portrayal might differentially affect responses. 
A further limitation of these studies is found with the Be-
havioral Prediction Test. The large number of trait sequences to 
which subjects were asked to respond necessitated that the original 
ten-item scale be shortened to five items. As with the likability 
measure, this scale may not have been sensitive enough to pick-up 
variations in actual cognitive processes. Further, the forced-
choice format of the BPT did not allow subjects a neutral or "I 
don't know" alternative. Thus, the actual choice may not be reflec-
tive of those cognitive processes occurring in more typical settings. 
Finally, the "meaningfulness" of the experimental procedures 
might be questioned. Although, as earlier stated, care was taken 
to provide response measures and tasks that appeared significant 
to younger children, the actual procedures may have been foreign to 
them. That is, the process of listening to stimulus traits and 
forming an impression based on them may be unusual to children. Pre-
operational children may have the cognitive abilities to form 
impressions similar to concrete and formal subjects, but may not be 
able to do so in the manner prescribed. Further, it might be argued 
that the procedures used forced the child to integrate the infor-
mation in an artificial manner. That is, the dependent measures 
dictated that subjects form single unified impressions. Such a 
procedure then would not allow determination of other social judg-
mental processes such as aggregation of responses. 
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The Development of Impression Formation Processes 
Although trends in all three studies suggest differences among 
cognitive levels in integration and valuation processes, few of the 
critical cognitive level by trait sequence interactions were signifi-
cant. Thus, it cannot be concluded with certainty that different 
cognitive abilities systematically affect social judgment processes. 
In part, the failure to find significant interactions may be due to 
several problems with the stimulus materials. First, the selection 
of stimulus traits was based on ratings made by kindergarten, 
second, fourth, and sixth grade children (Hendrick, Franz & Hoving, 
1974). Although these ratings may be representative of the three 
cognitive levels, the age groups were not the ones tested in the 
present research. That is, the judged likability of the traits for 
first grade, third grade, and college subjects may be different from 
the normative ratings. Any systematic variations in evaluative 
meaning of traits among cognitive levels would obscure differences 
in judgmental processes. Further, the relatively large standard 
deviations of the normative ratings of younger children, and the 
large standard deviations of preoperational judgments would suggest 
wide variations among younger children in the evaluative meaning of 
traits. This large variability would contribute to the within group 
error, further obscuring real differences in impression formation 
processes. 
Second, the failure to find significant interactions may have 
resulted because the average normative ratings of the traits com-
prising each trait sequence were not systematically controlled. 
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Traits randomly w·ere selected for each sequence without regard to 
actual scale values. Thus, the average scale values of the sequences 
were not always similar, or deviated from each other in the wrong 
direction. For example, in Study II the mean ratings of the single 
trait negative sets were more negatively polarized than the three 
and six trait sets. 
Finally, differences among traits on dimensions other than 
judged likability may have confounded the results. For example, the 
standard deviations of the negative traits were larger than the 
positive traits. This may indicate systematic differences among 
traits in "stability" as well as likability. In the present research, 
negative traits may have been more reflective of transient states 
(e.g., angry) than positive traits which may have reflected more 
enduring personality attributes (e.g., brave). In combinations of 
positive and negative stimuli, positive traits of higher stability 
may receive greater weight than the more transient negative traits 
(e.f., Edwards & Ernest, 1976). Thus, without controlling the 
stability of traits, the integration and valuation processes of 
subjects would further be obscured. In summary, the failure to find 
the hypothesized differences among cognitive levels may be attributed 
to the selection of stimulus materials. Weaknesses in design, in 
part, may be overcome by larger sample sizes or by having subjects 
rate more trait sets. Unfortunately, in the present research, the 
limited time alloted to each subject and the limited number of 
children available did not allm.;r for these possibilities. 
Although results ,.;rere weak, the conclusion that impression 
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formation processes follow a developmental frame>vork is consistent 
with previous research on social judgments (e.g., Gollin, 1958; 
Livesley & Bromley, 1973). However, the advantage of the present 
research is that it allowed greater control over the nature of the 
stimulus materials. That is, in earlier research there has been wide 
variations across studies in the source and types of information given 
and in judgments the subjects were asked to make (Schantz, 1975). 
By using trait adjectives rated on the same dimension that the final 
judgments were made (i.e., liking) the processes by which subjects 
select and integrate information can be determined. Of course, al-
ternative research strategies using trait stimuli may have been more 
effective in exploring these processes. For example, subjects might 
be asked to form impressions after each trait in a set is introduced. 
Such a strategy which does not rely on the final judgment might more 
clearly demonstrate how impressions develop and change. Subjects also 
might have been asked to make other types of judgments than ones of 
likability. For example, subjects might express their degree of 
certainty that various attributes are descriptive of a person char-
acterized by a set of traits (c. f., Edwards & Ostrom, 19 71). In 
heterogeneous trait sets, older subjects may indicate an equal 
weighting of traits by expressing a high degree of uncertainty about 
highly favorable and unfavorable attributes. Younger children may 
attach a high degree of certainty to those attributes which are 
evaluatively consistent with the traits they perceive as most salient 
(i.e., an unequal weighting of traits). Hmvever, the disadvantage 
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of these approaches and of all approaches using trait stimuli is the 
lack of generalizability to "real world" impression formation situ-
ations. In actual social judgment situations we often receive more 
and varied information about others. Using traits as stimuli, 
however, may serve as an initial step in exploring the unfolding of 
impression formation processes. Subsequent research may investigate 
the generalizability of these findings to more realistic judgmental 
situations. 
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APPENDIX D 
Trait 
Replication 
1 
mean ratings: 
2 
mean ratings: 
mean ratings 
across 
replications: 
Study I Trait Sequences 
pppp 
funny 
glad 
good 
smart 
2.04 
brave 
happy 
wonderful 
nice 
·1.89 
1.96 
Trait Sequence 
PPPN PPNN PNNN 
nice 
happy 
wonderful 
wrong 
2.55 
smart 
funny 
glad 
terrible 
3.07 
2.81 
kind 
brave 
bad 
sad 
3.85 
good 
right 
silly 
mad 
3.31 
3.58 
right 
mean 
unhappy 
terrible 
4.94 
kind 
strange 
angry 
sad 
4.36 
4.65 
NNNN 
angry 
silly 
mad 
strange 
4.68 
bad 
unhappy 
mean 
wrong 
5.44 
5.06 
Note. Traits were taken from Hendrick, Franz & Hoving (1974) list 
of 22 trait adjectives rated by children. Scoring was done 
on a 1-7 basis with 1 being the most likable. 
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Study II Trait Sequences 
Trait Seguence 
Trait Positive Negative 
Replication pppppp ppp p NNNNNN NNN N 
funny kind \vonderful silly bad mean 
smart nice sad strange 
1 good happy terrible unhappy 
glad angry 
brave mad 
right wrong 
mean ratings: 2.17 1. 78 1. 67 5.20 5.05 5.90 
nice right good mean sad terrible 
happy glad wrong mad 
2 smart funny strange silly 
wonderful angry 
kind bad 
brave unhappy 
mean ratings: 1.91 2.14 2.17 5.30 4.70 6.29 
mean ratings 
across 
replications: 2.04 1.96 1.92 5.25 4.88 6.10 
Note. Traits were taken from Hendrick~, Franz & Hoving (1974) list 
of 22 trait adjectives rated by children. Scoring was done 
on a 1-7 basis with 1 being the most likable. 
APPENDIX F 
Study III Trait Sequences 
Trait Trait Sequence 
Replication PPNN NNPP 
wonderful strange 
right unhappy 
1 angry good 
bad funny 
mean ratings: 3.84 3.45 
brave silly 
smart terrible 
2 mean glad 
mad kind 
mean ratings: 3.92 3.36 
mean ratings 
across replications: 3.88 3.40 
Note. Traits were taken from Hendrick, Franz & Hoving (1974) list 
of 22 trait adjectives rated by children. Scoring was done 
on a 1-7 basis with 1 being the most likable. 
160 
APPE~"'DIX G 
Nov8mber 1, 1977 
Dear Parent: 
The District has approved thp research proposal of Robert 
<:rnest, a graduate student at IJoyola University ·t-rho is completing 
the requirements for the Ph.D. in Psychology. 
The research project involves reading to children lists of 
adjectives that describe people. For example, "John is nice, kind, 
smart, good. 11 On the basis of these trait descriptions, the child-
ren are asked hm.v much they would like such a person and then select, 
from a series of cartoon drawings, situations that show the kind 
of behavior such a person ;.rould display. 
By studying the responses of the children, Hr. ~rnest hopes to 
learn more about the processes by which children make judgments. 
-:::ach child t.vill individually be questioned for no longer than 10 
minutes. The child will not be identified in the study. 
If you are Hilling for your child to participato in this 
research, please sign your name at the bottom of this she8t and 
have you child return it to school. If you have any questions 
or concerns, please feel free to call 1~. ?rnest at Loyola University 
(BR4-3000, extension 749). 
Sincerely, 
J/(. ( ;':' f/ 1· .... ~ -~' • 
, 
-+r-
...... 
r~ child has permiss~on to participate in this study. I under-
stand that no risk is involved and that I may wi thdra1v rrry child 
from participation at any time. 
(signature of parent) (date) 
162 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Robert C. Ernest has been read and 
approved by the following committee: 
Dr. John D. Edwards, Director 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
Dr. Deborah L. Holmes 
Assistant Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
Dr. Emil J. Posavac 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the disser-
tation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that 
any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation 
is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content 
and form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
~\~JVY\~ : L{-) \971 
Date 
~V\ \) ~ --"=-~-----'~dD__;:__ _ 
Director's Signature 
